The Limits of Good Law:
A Study of Housing Court Outcomes
Nicole Summers†
The enactment of the warranty of habitability in the early 1970s was hailed
as a revolution in tenants’ rights. Reversing centuries of legal precedent, the doctrine established that a tenant’s obligation to pay rent is contingent upon the landlord’s obligation to maintain the premises in good repair. Today, nearly fifty years
later, scholars and advocates frequently observe that the law has not lived up to
the potential originally envisioned. Yet these observations have been based on weak
empirical evidence. This Article presents the results of the first rigorous empirical
study on the effectiveness of the warranty of habitability. Based on statistical
analysis of over twelve hundred eviction case files and unit-level data matching of
these files to Housing Code enforcement records, the study finds that the overwhelming majority of tenants with meritorious warranty of habitability claims do
not benefit from the law at all.
The Article makes two significant contributions to the literature on the warranty of habitability. First, it establishes that an operationalization gap exists in
the law. While prior studies have observed that the warranty appears to be less
effective than originally envisioned, all suffered from methodological limitations.
These studies were either based on small, nonrepresentative samples or measured
the use of the warranty against the entire population of tenants facing nonpayment
of rent eviction. No study has been able to rigorously assess the use of the warranty
of habitability in cases where it should be used: those in which the tenant has a
meritorious claim. This study does so.
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Second, the Article upends the leading theories for why the warranty of
habitability is ineffective. These theories posit that tenants are unable to benefit
from the warranty of habitability because they lack access to legal representation
and/or because strict requirements exist for assertion of the claim. The findings of
this study show that neither theory withstands empirical scrutiny. Specifically, the
data reveal that although legal representation significantly affects a tenant’s likelihood of benefiting from the warranty of habitability, most represented tenants
with meritorious claims still do not benefit from the law at all. The findings also
demonstrate that the strict procedural requirements cannot explain the law’s
ineffectiveness—even where the requirements are absent, the law rarely protects
tenants.
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INTRODUCTION
Ms. J’s apartment in the South Bronx had become truly unlivable. The bathroom ceiling had collapsed, the walls were covered in mold, and the entire place was infested with mice.1 There
were leaks in the bedroom and bathroom that had become so severe that, on multiple occasions, water flooded not only Ms. J’s
apartment, but also the hallways of the building and neighboring units.2 Ms. J had called the City to report the problems, and
inspectors had cited the landlord for violations of the Housing
Code, but still no repairs had been made.3 Eventually, Ms. J
stopped paying rent, as was her legal right to do. Since the early
1970s, the warranty of habitability has established that a tenant’s obligation to pay rent is contingent upon the landlord’s obligation to maintain the premises in good repair.4 The law states
that where a landlord fails to maintain the property, the tenant
is entitled to a rent abatement—a reduction in the amount of
rent owed.5 Rather than fix the conditions in Ms. J’s apartment,

1
Request for and Report of Resource Assistant Premises Visit, Beaumont Management Group, LLC v Jackson, LT-021832-16/BX, *1–2 (NY City Civ filed Dec 21, 2016).
2
Id.
3
Open Violation Summary Report, Beaumont, LT-021832-16/BX, *1 (NY City Civ
filed Aug 8, 2017).
4
See Javins v First National Realty Corp, 428 F2d 1071, 1072–73 (DC Cir 1970).
The warranty of habitability is often referred to as the “implied warranty of habitability”
because it is implied in every residential rental agreement. See, for example, id at 1080
(“[T]he District’s housing code requires that a warranty of habitability be implied in the
leases of all housing that it covers.”). In New York, the doctrine is typically referred to as
the “warranty of habitability” because it was enacted by statute. See NY Real Prop Law
§ 235-b. I use the term “warranty of habitability” or simply “warranty” to reflect this local usage and for simplicity of language.
5
See, for example, Javins, 428 F2d at 1072–73 & n 3.
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however, the landlord filed an eviction action against her for
nonpayment of rent.6 The law contemplates this response and
allows the warranty of habitability to be asserted as a defense
and counterclaim to the eviction complaint.7
The two sides came into Housing Court in July 2016, and
the judge ordered the landlord to correct the defective conditions.8 The order required the landlord to make the repairs on
two specific dates in August.9 Yet Ms. J waited at home all day
both days, and no one ever showed.10 The parties went back into
court in early September, and the court again ordered the landlord to make the repairs—this time, a few weeks later.11 The
landlord again did not comply.12 This series of events repeated
itself six more times throughout the fall and winter of 2016, and
even into the spring and summer of 2017.13 Each time, the court
ordered the landlord to make the exact same repairs, and each
time, the landlord ignored the order.14 Eventually, the case settled.15 The landlord still had not made any of the repairs, but
Ms. J agreed to repay the full amount of the back rent.16 The
letter of the law had proven meaningless. Despite spending over
a year in court, Ms. J was unable to effectively invoke her right
to a rent abatement, nor was she able to use the law to secure
performance of the repairs. And Ms. J had an attorney.17
The warranty of habitability was hailed as a “revolution” in
landlord-tenant law;18 it was expected to provide a “powerful

6
Petition Non-Payment Dwelling, Beaumont, LT-021832-16/BX, *1 (NY City Civ
filed Apr 1, 2016).
7
See, for example, Park West Management Corp v Mitchell, 391 NE2d 1288, 1295
(NY 1979).
8
Stipulation of Settlement, Beaumont, LT-021832-16/BX, *1 (NY City Civ filed
July 27, 2016).
9
Id.
10 Affidavit of Respondent, Beaumont, LT-021832-16/BX, *2 (NY City Civ filed
July 14, 2017).
11 Stipulation of Settlement, Beaumont, LT-021832-16/BX, *1 (NY City Civ
filed Sept 7, 2016).
12 Stipulation of Settlement, Beaumont, LT-021832-16/BX, *1 (NY City Civ
filed Oct 26, 2016).
13 See Affirmation in Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion to Restore, Beaumont,
LT-021832-16/BX, *1–5 (NY City Civ filed July 18, 2017).
14 Id.
15 Abatement Hearing, Beaumont, LT-021832-16/BX, *1 (NY City Civ filed
Jan 12, 2018).
16 Id.
17 Affirmation in Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion to Restore, Beaumont,
LT-021832-16/BX, *1 (NY City Civ filed July 18, 2017).
18 Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes
and Consequences, 69 Cornell L Rev 517, 521 (1984).
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new remed[y] with which the urban poor could compel landlords
to maintain their buildings adequately.”19 Yet nearly fifty years
after the warranty’s enactment, to what extent is Ms. J’s experience typical, and to what extent is it an outlier? This Article
presents the results of the first large-scale empirical study rigorously assessing the extent to which there is a warranty of habitability operationalization gap—a gap between the number of
tenants with meritorious claims20 and the number of tenants
who receive some benefit from the claim. Determining that there
is a large gap, the study explores the reasons underlying it
through further empirical analysis. The results upend the leading theories on why the warranty of habitability is underenforced.
The study was conducted in the largest rental market in the
country, New York City,21 looking specifically at nonpayment of
rent eviction cases.22 Data was collected and analyzed to determine: (1) the overall rate of rent abatements in cases in which
the tenant has a meritorious warranty of habitability claim;
(2) whether and to what extent tenants with meritorious
warranty claims receive other benefits from the claim, such as
longer periods of time to repay rental arrears or avoidance of

19 David A. Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 99
Cal L Rev 389, 394 (2011). See also Paula A. Franzese, Abbott Gorin, and David J. Guzik,
The Implied Warranty of Habitability Lives: Making Real the Promise of Landlord-Tenant
Reform, 69 Rutgers L Rev 1, 12 (2016) (“Social justice reformers and tenants’ advocates
heralded the advent of the implied warranty of habitability with great hopefulness.”).
20 Cases with meritorious claims were identified based on evidence of conditions of
disrepair in the unit. For a detailed description of the methodology, see Part III.D.
21 According to the 2010 US Census, New York City had 2,146,892 renter households. See US Census Bureau, New York City Profile of General Population and Housing
Characteristics: 2010 (2010), archived at https://perma.cc/N8WR-9Y73. Los Angeles, the
next largest city in the United States, has only 814,305 renter households. See US
Census Bureau, Los Angeles City Profile of General Population and Housing Characteristics: 2010 (2010), archived at https://perma.cc/8PCK-4SJS. New York City was also selected as the site for this study for a number of other reasons. See Part III.B.
22 Although the warranty of habitability may be asserted by tenants affirmatively,
it is generally understood that the potential of the claim lies in its use as a defense and
counterclaim in nonpayment of rent eviction cases. Affirmative cases tend to involve
complicated and lengthy procedural requirements, and access to counsel is limited, as
legal services providers prioritize representation of tenants who are at risk of eviction.
See Jessica K. Steinberg, Informal, Inquisitorial, and Accurate: An Empirical Look at a
Problem-Solving Housing Court, 42 L & Soc Inquiry 1058, 1065 (2017). In eviction cases,
by contrast, tenants are already in court and can simply assert the claim as a defense or
counterclaim in the case. See Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 2–3 n 1
(cited in note 19). See also Steinberg, 42 L & Soc Inquiry at 1064–65 (cited in note 22)
(describing the problems involved in pursuing habitability claims both affirmatively and
defensively).
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possessory judgments;23 (3) whether and to what extent the warranty functions as a tool within eviction proceedings to secure
repairs; and (4) whether and to what extent legal representation
affects a tenant’s ability to benefit from the warranty where he
or she has a meritorious claim.
The study was conducted using two unique datasets of nonpayment of rent eviction cases from 2016. The first dataset is a
statistically significant sample of all nonpayment of rent eviction cases in which the tenant appeared. The second dataset is a
statistically significant sample of nonpayment of rent eviction
cases in which the tenant appeared and there were open
“hazardous” or “immediately hazardous” Housing Code violations at the unit at the time the case was filed.24 This dataset
was constructed based on a unique unit-level matching of eviction case data with Housing Code violation data. In total, over
twelve hundred nonpayment of rent eviction case files were
collected, reviewed, and coded.25
The study found that very few tenants with meritorious
warranty of habitability claims actually benefited from the law.
Overall, less than 2 percent of tenants who had meritorious
claims received rent abatements. Perhaps even more astonishing, only 7 percent of tenants whose landlords have been cited
by the City for hazardous or immediately hazardous Housing
23 A possessory judgment is a judgment that grants a legal right to possession of
the unit in favor of the landlord. Judgments in Nonpayment Cases (New York State
Unified Court System), archived at https://perma.cc/G586-F45F. In order for a landlord
to regain physical possession of a unit, the landlord must obtain a possessory judgment
and must be entitled to issuance and execution of the warrant of eviction. Id. Typically,
settlement agreements that include a possessory judgment also authorize the issuance of
the warrant of eviction, but stay execution of the warrant to provide the tenant time to
pay the rental arrears. If a tenant does not pay the arrears by the deadline included in
the settlement agreement, the landlord is authorized to execute the warrant of eviction
(in other words, physically evict the tenant) without appearing before a judge. New York
City Landlords & Owners: Questions & Answers About Housing Court *22 (Access to
Justice NY State Courts, July 2012), archived at https://perma.cc/RL65-A2GJ. Where a
settlement agreement does not include a possessory judgment, the landlord must file a
motion for issuance of judgment upon the tenant’s breach, and the judge must allow that
motion before the landlord can proceed with the physical eviction. Id. Thus, tenants have
stronger procedural protections against physical eviction where they are able to avoid
possessory judgments.
24 The Housing Code system in New York City has three classifications of violations: “Class A” for nonhazardous violations, such as a bathroom door that needs refitting or painting that needs to be done; “Class B” for hazardous violations, such as a defective carbon monoxide detector; and “Class C” for immediately hazardous violations,
such as the lack of heat or hot water. See NYC Admin Code § 27-2001 et seq. Class A
violations must be repaired within ninety days, Class B within thirty days, and Class C
within twenty-four hours. NYC Admin Code § 27-2001 et seq.
25 A more detailed description of the study’s methodology is provided in Part III.D.
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Code violations—a subset of those who had meritorious claims—
received abatements. The findings also rule out the possibility
that tenants with meritorious claims are reaping other types of
benefits from their claims. Tenants with meritorious claims are
no more likely to avoid possessory judgments or to receive longer
periods of time to repay arrears as compared with tenants without meritorious warranty claims.26 The study also found that
although tenants are more likely to benefit from the warranty of
habitability when they have legal representation, the lack of access to counsel does not sufficiently account for the operationalization gap. The significant majority—at least 70 percent—of
tenants who were represented by counsel and had meritorious
warranty of habitability claims still did not receive a rent
abatement. Finally, the findings showed that while eviction proceedings are indeed functioning as a forum to order landlords to
perform needed repairs, the forum lacks accountability. Specifically, in 72 percent of cases in which the landlord agreed to
make repairs in a court-ordered settlement agreement and there
was a subsequent settlement agreement in the case, the tenant
reported that those repairs were still outstanding in a subsequent court appearance.
These findings make two broad sets of contributions to the
scholarly literature on the warranty of habitability. First, the
findings provide rigorous evidence of the existence of an operationalization gap in the warranty of habitability. While much research has pointed to problems with the warranty’s implementation, prior empirical studies have consistently taken one of two
forms. One set of studies has examined the overall frequency
with which tenants assert warranty of habitability claims in
court or receive rent abatements, without distinguishing between tenants who do and do not have meritorious claims.27 A
second set of studies has taken the form of nonrepresentative
observational or case studies that have looked at outcomes

26 For a detailed description of the meaning and significance of a possessory
judgment, see note 23.
27 See Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 22–23 (cited in note 19);
Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants’
Voices in Legal Process, 20 Hofstra L Rev 533, 547–48 nn 52–54 (1992); Anthony J. Fusco
Jr, Nancy B. Collins, and Julian R. Birnbaum, Chicago’s Eviction Court: A Tenants’
Court of No Resort, 17 Urban L Ann 93, 109–11 (1979); Marilyn Miller Mosier and
Richard A. Soble, Modern Legislation, Metropolitan Court, Miniscule Results: A Study of
Detroit’s Landlord-Tenant Court, 7 U Mich J L Ref 8, 42 (1973).
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among small groups of tenants with meritorious claims.28 This
study is the first thus far to rigorously examine on a large, representative scale the extent to which tenants benefit from the
warranty of habitability when they have meritorious claims. It
is also the first study to assess the possibility that tenants use
the warranty of habitability to obtain beneficial outcomes in
their cases other than rent abatements. That is, prior studies
have not examined whether tenants use their entitlement to a
rent abatement as leverage to achieve other desired case outcomes, such as longer repayment periods or the avoidance of
possessory judgments. This study does so.
Second, the findings of this study debunk the conventional
wisdom on the reasons for the ineffectiveness of the warranty of
habitability. Since the warranty’s initial enactment nearly fifty
years ago, scholars have tried to explain why tenants have not
appeared to benefit from the law to the extent originally envisioned. The existing scholarship reflects a general consensus
around two explanations: (1) tenants lack access to counsel, and
(2) there are onerous legal requirements for asserting a claim.29
Recent scholarship has also hypothesized that the warranty is
underutilized in part because judges lack ready access to
Housing Code violation records.30 The findings of this study
upend all of these existing theories.
First, the study finds that legal representation accounts for
only a small fraction of the overall operationalization gap. While
many previous studies have analyzed whether tenants who have
access to counsel are more likely to receive rent abatements or
raise warranty of habitability claims in court, none has measured the impact of legal representation specifically where the
tenant had a meritorious claim.31 This is the first study thus far
28 See Michele Cotton, When Judges Don’t Follow the Law: Research and Recommendations, 19 CUNY L Rev 57, 67–69 (2015) (noting that many of the fifty-nine cases
studied involved serious housing code violations recorded in city inspections); Franzese,
Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 23 n 97 (cited in note 19) (finding that among a
sample of thirty-one cases studied in which the warranty of habitability was raised, it
successfully led to repairs in approximately half).
29 See Part II.
30 Id.
31 See D. James Greiner, Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, and Jonathan Hennessy,
The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance: A Randomized Study in a Massachusetts
District Court and Prospects for the Future, 126 Harv L Rev 901, 931 (2013); Jessica K.
Steinberg, In Pursuit of Justice? Case Outcomes and the Delivery of Unbundled Legal
Services, 18 Georgetown J Poverty L & Pol 453, 494 (2011); Carroll Seron, Martin
Frankel, and Gregg Van Ryzin, The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor
Tenants in New York City’s Housing Court: Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35 L &
Soc Rev 419, 428 (2001).
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to do so, and the finding shows that while representation matters, the vast majority of represented tenants who have meritorious claims still do not benefit from the warranty. Second, the
study finds the existence of a large operationalization gap even
though New York lacks any of the onerous legal requirements
for assertion of a claim. Thus, while these requirements may
impose meaningful barriers where they exist, the findings of this
study demonstrate that they do not sufficiently explain the warranty’s lack of implementation. And finally, the findings also refute the theory that providing judges easy access to Housing
Code violation records, without more, will serve as a meaningful
solution to the warranty’s operationalization failures. Code enforcement records are readily available to Housing Court judges
in New York City,32 yet the data show that judges rarely take
advantage of the opportunity to access them.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I delves into the history of the warranty of habitability and explains the policy goals
that drove its widespread enactment in the 1970s. Part II reviews the existing theoretical and empirical scholarship on the
law’s usage. Part III describes the objectives, data, and methodology of the study conducted. Part IV presents and analyzes the
results. Part V describes the significance of these findings for
our understanding of the warranty’s implementation and the
reasons for its ineffectiveness. The Conclusion points to directions for future research.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
The implied warranty of habitability has a nearly fifty-year
history. First articulated in 1970, the doctrine was adopted with
the expectation that it would bring transformative change to the
landlord-tenant relationship. Advocates and scholars believed
that the law would level the playing field in eviction cases, compensate for ineffectual code enforcement systems, and serve as a
strong deterrent mechanism against landlord property neglect.
These expectations were widely shared by advocates, legislators,
and jurists across the country.33 Following the warranty’s initial

32

Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 34 (cited in note 19).
Rabin, 69 Cornell L Rev at 521 (cited in note 18) (noting the deep involvement of
courts and legislatures in implementing the warranty); Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69
Rutgers L Rev at 12 (cited in note 19) (noting the hopefulness of social justice and tenants’ rights advocates that the warranty would increase the habitability of residential
dwellings); Mosier and Soble, 7 U Mich J L Ref at 13 (cited in note 27) (noting the need
33
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adoption in the District of Columbia, forty-nine states embraced
it in an extraordinarily short period of time.34 This Part describes the social, political, and legal concerns that motivated
the creation of the warranty of habitability, and then traces its
judicial and legislative adoption.
A. Motivations for the Warranty of Habitability
Prior to the enactment of the implied warranty of habitability, the doctrine of caveat emptor—buyer beware—applied to
residential rental agreements.35 Landlords had limited obligations to maintain their units, and thus tenants were largely left
to their own devices when conditions fell into disrepair. This
doctrine was rooted in nineteenth-century law that conceived of
the lease as merely a possessory interest in land.36 A landlord
fulfilled his or her obligations under the lease simply by conveying the land.37 The tenant then had complete control over the
land and was responsible for maintaining any structures on it,
while also assuming unconditional liability for the rent.38 The
lease contained no implied promises regarding the state of the
premises being conveyed.39 This scheme developed in an agrarian context in which the typical lease had a lengthy term and the
tenant farmer was as well positioned to make the repairs as the
landlord.40
As demographic shifts occurred in the twentieth century, it
became increasingly clear that caveat emptor was ill-suited to

for reform recognized by commentators, courts, legislatures, and model landlord-tenant
codes).
34 See text accompanying notes 75–78.
35 For a more detailed discussion of caveat lessee and early landlord-tenant law,
see generally Thomas M. Quinn and Earl Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of the Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38 Fordham L Rev 225 (1969).
36 See Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 10–11 (cited in note 19).
37 See Richard H. Chused, Saunders (a.k.a. Javins) v. First National Realty
Corporation, 11 Georgetown J Poverty L & Pol 191, 197 (2004).
38 Id. The early common law rules even held tenants liable for rent after the premises had been destroyed by fire or other natural disasters. See id at 197 n 18. Many state
legislatures changed these rules by statute in the nineteenth century. Id.
39 Id at 198 (“The basic lease—the exchange of possession for rent—was both substantively and procedurally independent from other contractual terms.”). When leases
contained other covenants, those covenants were construed to be independent of each
other, and thus a landlord’s violation of one covenant did not relieve a tenant of his or
her obligations under another covenant. See id.
40 See Mosier and Soble, 7 U Mich J L Ref at 12 (cited in note 27). Marilyn Mosier
and Richard Soble also observe that in an agrarian context the dwellings conveyed were
simple, and thus repairs were relatively inexpensive. Id.
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the realities of modern landlord-tenant relationships.41 By the
1960s and 1970s, overcrowded slums with dilapidated housing
had come to characterize urban centers.42 Poor tenants faced
egregious and unsafe living conditions, and extremely few had
the resources necessary to make the repairs.43 The nature of contemporary landlord-tenant relationships also created different
expectations.44 A tenant renting an apartment usually held a
short-term lease and expected to receive more than the land itself. The tenant instead sought to rent a dwelling equipped with
utilities and functioning amenities.45 There was a growing
movement among legal advocates and scholars to modernize
41 See Javins v First National Realty Corp, 428 F2d 1071, 1074 (DC Cir 1970) (citation omitted):

[I]n the case of the modern apartment dweller, the value of the lease is that it
gives him a place to live. The city dweller who seeks to lease an apartment on
the third floor of a tenement has little interest in the land 30 or 40 feet below,
or even in the bare right to possession within the four walls of his apartment.
When American city dwellers, both rich and poor, seek “shelter” today, they
seek a well known package of goods and services—a package which includes
not merely walls and ceilings, but also adequate heat, light and ventilation,
serviceable plumbing facilities, secure windows and doors, proper sanitation,
and proper maintenance.
Courts also recognized that landlord-tenant law had failed to keep pace with developments in contract law, where judicial interpretation has “sought to protect the legitimate
expectations of the buyer and ha[s] steadily widened the seller’s responsibility for the
quality of goods and services through implied warranties of fitness and merchantability.”
Id at 1075.
42 See id at 1078–79 (noting that “[l]ow and middle income tenants, even if
they were interested in making repairs, would be unable to obtain any financing for major repairs since they have no long-term interest in the property”). Discriminatory federal housing policies severely restricted the housing options available to minority populations while at the same time facilitating white flight out of cities. The result was that
minority tenants were forced into a limited supply of urban tenements, and cities became drained of their tax bases as property values plummeted. See Super, 99 Cal L Rev
at 402 (cited in note 19).
43 Quinn and Phillips, 38 Fordham L Rev at 225 (cited in note 35), observing that
tenants lived in
the most wretched living conditions, littered and unlit hallways, stairways
with steps and banisters missing, walls and ceilings with holes, exposed wiring, broken windows, leaking pipes, stoves and refrigerators that do not work
or work only now and then. And always the cockroaches, the rats, and the
dread of the winter cold and uncertain heat.
Substandard conditions can cause serious physical and emotional harm. See Super, 99
Cal L Rev at 452 (cited in note 19) (“Chipping and peeling paint at home is the dominant
cause of childhood lead poisoning, which can profoundly and permanently stunt children’s intellectual and emotional development. Asthma is the leading cause of urban
school absences, and roach, rodent, and mold infestation are leading causes of asthma.”)
(citations omitted).
44 See Mosier and Soble, 7 U Mich J L Ref at 12–13 (cited in note 27).
45 Id.
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residential landlord-tenant law to conform to these expectations
and needs.46
Housing codes had been enacted in many jurisdictions by
this time, allowing for landlords to be held civilly and criminally
liable for substandard conditions in their properties.47 However,
there was strong consensus that enforcement was lacking.48 The
costs associated with prosecuting landlords were high, and as
commentators noted at the time, only “extreme violation[s] [ ]
ha[d] any chance of being remedied in the major city setting,
where large numbers of old buildings [we]re deteriorating rapidly.”49 Code enforcement agencies were underfunded and overwhelmed, and most lacked sufficient adjudicatory resources to
pursue aggressive litigation.50 The agencies were also reluctant
to seek criminal sanctions.51 Civil liability, meanwhile, was proving an ineffective deterrent mechanism because fines were too

46 See generally Trends in Landlord-Tenant Law Including Model Code, 6 Real
Prop Prob & Trust J 550 (1971). See also Quinn and Phillips, 38 Fordham L Rev at 239–
49 (cited in note 35). Additionally, the warranty of habitability intended to harmonize
the decline of caveat emptor in contract law with housing law. See Super, 99 Cal L Rev
at 400 (cited in note 19).
47 Several courts noted that the establishment of housing codes reflected the legislative reversal of the doctrine of caveat lessee. See, for example, Pines v Perssion, 111
NW2d 409, 412–13 (Wis 1961):

[T]he legislature has made a policy judgment—that it is socially (and politically) desirable to impose these duties [of repair] on a property owner—which has
rendered the old common law rule obsolete. To follow the old rule of no implied
warranty of habitability in leases would, in our opinion, be inconsistent with
the current legislative policy concerning housing standards.
See also Green v Superior Court, 517 P2d 1168, 1175 (Cal 1974) (“These comprehensive
housing codes affirm that, under contemporary conditions, public policy compels landlords to bear the primary responsibility for maintaining safe, clean and habitable housing.”). The development of the doctrine of constructive eviction further contributed to the
erosion of caveat lessee. See Mosier and Soble, 7 U Mich J L Ref at 12 (cited in note 27).
Under this doctrine, the tenant is entitled to terminate the lease by vacating the property if the premises are in such disrepair that they are unfit for human use. Upon vacating
the premises, the tenant’s rental obligation ends. However, commentators at the time
noted that while commercial lessees were in a position to take advantage of this development, the law was largely meaningless for residential tenants, for whom no better
housing options were available if they opted to terminate their current lease. Id.
48 For an excellent discussion of current limitations in the enforcement of housing
codes, see generally Kathryn A. Sabbeth, (Under)enforcement of Poor Tenants’ Rights, 27
Georgetown J Poverty L & Pol 99 (2019).
49 Quinn and Phillips, 38 Fordham L Rev at 240 (cited in note 35).
50 See Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 414 (cited in note 19).
51 Quinn and Phillips, 38 Fordham L Rev at 240–41 (cited in note 35) (noting that
“[s]ending landlords to prison is not very popular” and that the moral effect of criminal
liability remains small: “What about the opprobrium of a conviction? That carries about
the same sting as a traffic ticket.”).
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low.52 It was often cheaper for a landlord to pay a court-ordered
fine than to make repairs.53 Thus, as a mechanism for holding
landlords accountable for making repairs, code enforcement was
broadly considered “inefficient and unworkable.”54 It became
widely understood that the modern realities of rental housing
demanded a stronger legal tool.55
Public outrage was also growing at the law’s toleration of
slum conditions, particularly in urban centers.56 The civil and
52

See id at 240.
Id at 241.
54 See Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 402 (cited in note 19).
55 See Javins, 428 F2d at 1079–80 (noting that “the findings by various studies of
the social impact of bad housing has led to the realization that poor housing is detrimental to the whole society, not merely to the unlucky ones who must suffer the daily
indignity of living in a slum”). It was also widely understood that other available mechanisms for holding landlords accountable for property maintenance were insufficient. See
Quinn and Phillips, 38 Fordham L Rev at 243 (cited in note 35). The doctrine of constructive eviction allowed tenants to break their leases where landlords so badly neglected the premises that they became unlivable. Id at 242. However, tenants could only exercise this defense if they actually abandoned the building, essentially defeating the
whole purpose of raising it. Id. Some jurisdictions also had rent-withholding laws, which
allowed tenants to deposit their rent into escrow in court rather than pay the landlord
when they experienced uninhabitable housing conditions, but commentators noted that
tenants lacked bargaining power to invoke this law once their lease neared expiration. Id
at 242–43. Moreover, the typical “urban ghetto tenant,” who lived in buildings in the
worst condition, had tenancy rights only as a “tenant by sufferance.” Id at 243. This
meant that the tenants most in need of the protection of the law lacked sufficient leverage to use rent-withholding on its own effectively. Id. In New York, § 755 of the New
York Real Property Actions & Proceedings Law (RPAPL) also allowed a tenant to withhold rent for lack of services, but this section only applied (and continues to apply today)
when “a serious violation against the landlord [has been] recorded by a government bureau.” Id at 245. The statute, therefore, does not help tenants with a collection of smaller
issues in an apartment. Besides withholding of rent, § 302A of New York’s Multiple
Dwelling Law allows for rental abatement if the landlord fails to supply services, but a
tenant can only invoke § 302A after suffering from the issue for six months. Id at 247.
Furthermore, a landlord can prevail at court in a § 302A action simply by repairing the
major violation and allowing the smaller issues to continue—thus exposing the tenant to
a defeat in court and “$100 in court costs plus the rent.” Id at 247 (citations omitted).
Upon critiquing these available mechanisms, Professors Thomas Quinn and Earl
Phillips proposed treating “the rent as a package containing payment components,”
which would give landlords an absolute rent floor for possession and allow tenants to
withhold rent above that floor for service failures. Id at 253.
56 See Quinn and Phillips, 38 Fordham L Rev at 225 (cited in note 35):
53

[T]he law in this area is a scandal. More often than not unjust in its preference
for the cause of the landlord, it can only be described as outrageous when applied to the poor urban tenant in the multi-family dwelling. . . . Surely the law
in a civilized urban society cannot tolerate such conditions. But it does! Let
that be said frankly and without hedging.
See also Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 402 (cited in note 19) (“Deteriorating housing conditions
have serious negative effects on surrounding communities: they depress property values
and hence property tax revenues, contribute to the spread of insect and rodent infestation, give cities a negative image with visitors, and are correlated with crime.”).
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welfare rights movements had swept the nation, generating a
broad set of demands to expand the rights of poor and marginalized groups. As housing conditions were deteriorating and the
size of urban slums was expanding, this context helped fuel a
broad tenants’ rights movement.57 Organized tenants held rent
strikes, picketed, and engaged in other forms of protest to demand improved housing quality and affordability, while also
standing behind litigation and lobbying efforts oriented toward
the same goals.58
The grassroots activism and legal reform efforts for better
housing conditions coalesced around the goal of establishing an
implied warranty of habitability in residential leases.59 The
warranty would make the tenant’s covenant to pay rent mutual
with the landlord’s covenant to make repairs.60 Thus, where
landlords did not keep premises in good repair, tenants would be
relieved of all or a part of their rental obligations.61 Tenants
would be “deputize[d]” to act as “private attorney[s] general,”
empowered to impose automatic financial consequences on their
landlords whenever they failed to address known disrepair.62
Advocates believed that this scheme of financial liability would
serve as a much-needed accountability and deterrence mechanism.63 Whereas landlords realistically perceived the threat of
financial penalties for code violations or damages imposed by affirmative litigation to be minor, it was expected that landlords
would take the threat of losing all rent revenues—imposed
57 See Mark D. Naison, The Rent Strikes in New York, in Stephen Burghardt, ed,
Tenants and the Urban Housing Crisis 19, 19 (New Press 1972); Thea K. Flaum and
Elizabeth C. Salzman, The Tenants’ Rights Movement 3–4, 16–18 (Urban Research Corporation 1969).
58 See Mosier and Soble, 7 U Mich J L Ref at 13–14 (cited in note 27); Note, Tenant
Unions: Collective Bargaining and the Low-Income Tenant, 77 Yale L J 1368, 1392
(1968). Advocates also sought to prohibit discrimination, impose rent control, limit evictions, and expand subsidies to support affordable housing development. Note, 77 Yale L
J at 1370–73.
59 See Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 398–99 (cited in note 19).
60 Id at 401. This reciprocity was a sharp departure from long-standing common
law rules that lease terms were substantively and procedurally independent from one
another. See Chused, 11 Georgetown J Poverty L & Pol at 198 (cited in note 37). Under
this regime, the landlord’s failure to comply with one obligation could not be used to defend a claim that the tenant breached a different obligation (such as the payment of
rent). Id.
61 See Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 401 (cited in note 19).
62 See Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 12 (cited in note 19).
63 See Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 403 (cited in note 19). Professor David Super further
notes that advocacy to establish the implied warranty of habitability was also grounded
in “a desire to redistribute power, wealth, and income into the hands of low-income
people.” Id at 402 (citations omitted).
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without the need for bureaucratic intervention or a drawn out
court proceeding—much more seriously.64
B. Establishment of the Warranty of Habitability
In 1970, the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit became the first court to recognize the warranty of habitability.65 In Javins v First National Realty Corp,66 the court held
that “a warranty of habitability . . . is implied by operation of
law into leases of urban dwelling units . . . and that breach of
this warranty gives rise to the usual remedies for breach of contract.”67 The issue came before the court in the context of an
eviction action for nonpayment of rent.68 The tenants had failed
to pay rent, and when the landlord brought an eviction case
seeking possession on that basis, they asserted as a defense that
they were relieved of their rental obligations because the landlord had failed to make needed repairs.69
Before Javins, “the only nonprocedural defenses [to nonpayment of rent eviction] had been payment of the rent claimed
and constructive eviction.”70 The court in Javins, however, both
64 See id at 403 (noting further that this threat “would be much more likely to
motivate landlords to make concessions to their tenants in the form of needed repairs”).
65 Javins, 428 F2d at 1072.
66 428 F2d 1071 (DC Cir 1970).
67 Id at 1072–73. The Court reasoned that the outdated principle that a lease conveys
only a possessory interest in land “may have been reasonable in a rural, agrarian society,”
but was no longer sensible “in the case of the modern apartment dweller.” Id at 1074.
68 The Javins litigation arose out of a rent strike waged by poor tenants living in
deplorable conditions in a low-income, minority neighborhood of Washington, DC. See
Chused, 11 Georgetown J Poverty L & Pol at 206–10 (cited in note 37). The tenants had
no heat for six weeks in winter and were facing a host of other conditions that the landlord was refusing to address. After a series of protests and sit-ins at government offices,
none of which compelled the landlord to make repairs, twenty-nine tenants collectively
organized and sent a letter to the landlord declaring that they were withholding rent
until the conditions were repaired. The landlord began suing tenants for possession and
won, which caused other tenants to surrender their withheld rent. Six tenants, however,
continued to strike, and their eviction cases eventually became those that were taken up
on appeal in Javins. For a detailed description of the events that led to the Javins litigation, see id at 194–210.
69 Javins, 428 F2d at 1073. Specifically, the tenants “alleged numerous violations of
the Housing Regulations as an equitable defense or [a] claim by way of recoupment or
set-off in an amount equal to the rent claim, as provided in the rules of the Court of
General Sessions.” Id (quotation marks omitted). The tenants claimed

[t]hat there are approximately 1500 violations of the Housing Regulations of
the District of Columbia in the building . . . where defendant resides[,] some affecting the premises of this Defendant directly, others indirectly, and all tending to establish a course of conduct of violation of the Housing Regulations to
the damage of Defendants.
70

See Mosier and Soble, 7 U Mich J L Ref at 10 (cited in note 27).
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recognized the implied warranty of habitability as a legal doctrine and held that it could be invoked as a substantive defense
in a nonpayment of rent eviction. The court declared that “the
tenant’s obligation to pay rent is dependent upon the landlord’s
performance of his obligations, including his warranty to maintain the premises in habitable condition.”71 It explained that in
adjudicating whether the landlord had a right to possession of
the apartment for nonpayment of rent, the lower court must
first determine whether the tenants were relieved of all or a part
of their rental obligations as a result of the landlord’s failure to
repair.72 The reduction in the amount of rent owed, known as a
rent abatement, is typically described as a percentage of the total rent owed and is based on the severity of the substandard
conditions and the length of time for which they persisted.73 The
court further held that if the defective conditions extinguished
the tenants’ rental liability, the tenants were entitled to retain
possession of the apartment.74
A wave of similar judicial opinions followed. By the late
1970s, courts in California, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Washington, and Wisconsin, among
others, had recognized the implied warranty of habitability.75
Legislatures also acted swiftly.76 By the time New York passed
its warranty of habitability statute in 1975, the warranty of habitability had already been recognized by legislatures in Rhode
Island (1970), Arizona (1974), and Delaware (1974).77 The doctrine was eventually adopted in some form in every state except
Arkansas.78 The specific contours of the laws varied, but in its
most progressive iterations, including in New York, the warranty
of habitability relieved tenants of all or a part of their rental obligations so long as (1) the landlord had notice of the defective
71

Javins, 428 F2d at 1082.
In Javins, the court held specifically that the lower court must determine
“(1) whether the alleged violations existed during the period for which past due rent is
claimed, and (2) what portion, if any or all, of the tenant’s obligation to pay rent was
suspended by the landlord’s breach.” Id at 1082–83 (citations omitted).
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 See Roger A. Cunningham, The New Implied and Statutory Warranties of
Habitability in Residential Leases: From Contract to Status, 16 Urban L Ann 3, 6–8
(1979); Green, 517 P2d at 1181; Lund v MacArthur, 462 P2d 482, 483 (Hawaii 1969);
Lemle v Breeden, 462 P2d 470, 475 (Hawaii 1969).
76 Super observes that the simultaneous progression of the implied warranty of
habitability through courts and legislatures was unusual as compared to other law reform initiatives. See Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 398–99 (cited in note 19).
77 See Cunningham, 16 Urban L Ann at 7 nn 8–11 (cited in note 75).
78 Id at 7–8 (listing statutes and cases).
72
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conditions, either constructively,79 orally, or in writing from the
tenant or from a public agency (with no requirement that a
housing code violation be issued); (2) the defective conditions affected the habitability of the premises; and (3) the landlord had
failed to make repairs.80 Most jurisdictions also adopted accompanying laws protecting tenants from retaliatory eviction when
they invoked their right to withhold rent as permitted by the
warranty.81
While courts and legislatures cited numerous reasons for
adoption of the warranty of habitability,82 they overwhelmingly
emphasized that the law would act as a tool for improving the
rental housing stock occupied by low- and moderate-income families.83 The Javins court noted that the “inequality in bargaining
power” between landlords and tenants left tenants with “little
leverage to enforce demands for better housing.”84 Among other
barriers, tenants were prevented from successfully negotiating
for improved conditions because “racial and class discrimination
79 Notice is deemed to be constructive when the landlord knew or should have
known about the conditions based on interactions with the property. For example, landlords are often held to have constructive notice of a condition when the condition existed
at the time they purchased the property or because the condition exists in plain view and
the landlord has entered the premises. See, for example, Whitney v Valentin, 963 NYS2d
109, 110 (NY App 2013).
80 In jurisdictions with more progressive forms of the law, tenants also are not required to deposit withheld rent into court nor to demonstrate “good faith” withholding—
any tenant who has experienced conditions of disrepair during the course of their tenancy can assert breach of the implied warranty of habitability either affirmatively in a suit
against their landlord or defensively in an eviction action for nonpayment of rent. See,
for example, NY Real Prop Law § 235-b. The warranty of habitability is also deemed
nonwaivable. Katheryn M. Dutenhaver, Non-Waiver of the Implied Warranty of Habitability in Residential Leases, 10 Loyola U Chi L J 41, 55 (1978). In at least one jurisdiction, tenants may also assert the claim as a defense to no fault evictions. See Mass Gen
Laws Ann ch 239, § 8A. In many jurisdictions, courts and legislatures adopted corollary
laws prohibiting landlords from evicting tenants in retaliation for invoking their rights under the warranty of habitability. See Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 411 n 118 (cited in note 19).
81 Retaliatory Eviction of Tenant for Reporting Landlord’s Violation of Law, 23
ALR5th 140 § 2[a] (1994); Mosier and Soble, 7 U Mich J L Ref at 13 (cited in note 27).
The warranty of habitability is also generally considered nonwaivable, such that any effort to contract around it in the lease is void as against public policy. See Dutenhaver,
10 Loyola U Chi L J at 55 (cited in note 80).
82 These reasons included a desire to harmonize landlord-tenant law with broader
principles of contract and consumer protection law, recognition that the doctrine of
caveat lessee was ill-fitted with the realities of modern urban living, and a questioning of
the common law assumption that the land was the most important feature of a leasehold. See Javins, 428 F2d at 1077–78.
83 See Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 402 (cited in note 19) (noting that some courts and
legislatures “saw the implied warranty and its enforceability in actions for nonpayment
of rent as a means of compelling landlords to maintain their buildings up to minimum
standards of repair”).
84 Javins, 428 F2d at 1079.
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and standardized form leases . . . [left] tenants in a take it or
leave it situation.”85 Severe shortages in affordable rental housing further exacerbated the inequalities in bargaining power,
which, as the California Supreme Court observed, meant that
“even when defects are apparent the low income tenant frequently has no realistic alternative but to accept such housing.”86 Mirroring the views of activists and commentators, courts
also emphasized that the resource constraints faced by housing
code enforcement agencies made a private remedy and right of
action for tenants facing substandard housing conditions all the
more necessary.87 These concerns were echoed repeatedly
throughout the country by courts and legislatures as they ushered in one of the most revolutionary changes to landlord-tenant
law in modern history.88
C. Developments in Warranty of Habitability Laws
In recent years, many jurisdictions have narrowed the circumstances in which the warranty of habitability can be invoked. They have done so by adopting three types of limiting
rules. First, “good faith” laws require tenants to demonstrate
genuine withholding of rent for bad conditions.89 Under these
laws, tenants cannot assert the warranty as a defense unless
they can show that their motive for not paying rent was the
landlord’s failure to repair.90 The laws effectively excuse landlords’ noncompliance with their obligations by removing the
financial consequences the warranty imposes whenever the failure to repair coincides with other events that cause the tenant
85

Id (citations omitted).
Green, 517 P2d at 1174. See also Karen Tokarz and Zachary Schmook, Law
School Clinic and Community Legal Services Providers Collaborate to Advance the
Remedy of Implied Warranty of Habitability in Missouri, 53 Wash U J L & Pol 169, 187
(2017) (observing that the implied warranty of habitability “developed, in part, as a
response to a chronic and prolonged housing shortage, particularly for low-income
households”).
87 See Boston Housing Authority v Hemingway, 293 NE2d 831, 839–40 (Mass 1973).
88 Although many advocates hoped that the implied warranty of habitability would
be held constitutionally required, the US Supreme Court rejected this argument. See
Lindsey v Normet, 405 US 56, 64 (1972). The Court held that federal constitutional principles of due process and equal protection do not require that a tenant be allowed to raise
conditions issues as a defense to a nonpayment of rent eviction. Id at 68–69.
89 See Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 425, 425 n 172 (cited in note 19). Super finds that
most states have good faith requirements. See id.
90 Some commentators defend these laws on the grounds that tenants should not be
allowed to raise the warranty of habitability as a “legal afterthought.” See, for example,
Samuel Jan Brakel, URLTA in Operation: The Oregon Experience, 5 Am Bar Found
Rsrch J 565, 569 (1980).
86
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to fall behind in rent. The laws also practically diminish the
availability of the warranty by increasing the burden of proof;
some tenants who genuinely intended to withhold rent for defective conditions may simply have insufficient evidence to make
out a good faith showing.
Second, many legislatures and courts have imposed landlords’ protective orders, also known as “rent escrow” laws, requiring tenants to deposit unpaid rent with the court as a condition of asserting the warranty of habitability.91 Some versions of
rent escrow laws require tenants to deposit their rent at the
time of the withholding, whereas others impose the requirement
upon the tenant’s assertion of the warranty defense in the eviction case.92 Most commentators consider rent escrow requirements to severely limit the warranty’s effectiveness.93 Many
tenants are unaware of the requirements and fail to comply with
them during the appropriate time period. Thus by the time they
appear in court, they have already effectively waived their right

91 See Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 13–14 (cited in note 19).
Some jurisdictions have mandatory rent escrow requirements, in which all tenants who
wish to withhold rent must deposit their rent with the court. Id. Other jurisdictions hold
hearings in which judges make individualized determinations of whether rent escrow
will be required based on the circumstances of the case. Id. Proponents of landlords’ protective orders (LPOs) have justified them as necessary to prevent tenants from using the
implied warranty of habitability in bad faith to shirk valid rental obligations. Id at 13.
Many scholars, however, criticize LPOs as creating artificial barriers to access the warranty. See, for example, id at 17–18, noting that rent escrow requirements

put[ ] aggrieved tenants into the untenable position of having to decide whether
to relocate (a task that is both disruptive and costly), or remain on site, submit to
judicial proceedings, and be forced to deposit into escrow the full rent due no
matter the premises’ defective condition, a task that is both onerous and counterproductive to the goal of improving stocks of decent rental housing.
See also Cotton, 19 CUNY L Rev at 71–73 (cited in note 28).
92 There are also some jurisdictions in which rent escrow orders are available only
upon motion by the landlord and at the discretion of the judge. See Alaska Stat Ann
§ 34.03.190(a)(3); Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 33-1365(A); Hinson v Delis, 102 Cal Rptr 661, 666
(Cal App 1972); Javins, 428 F2d at 1083 n 67; Rotheimer v Arana, 892 NE2d 1183, 1194–
95 (Ill App 2008); Iowa Code § 562A.24(1); Kan Stat Ann § 58-2561(a); Ky Rev Stat Ann
§ 383.645(1); Mass Gen Laws Ann ch 239, § 8A; Mont Code Ann § 70-24-421(1); Neb Rev
Stat § 76-1428(1); Or Rev Stat § 90.370(1)(b); Pugh v Holmes, 405 A2d 897, 907 (Pa 1979);
RI Gen Laws § 34-18-32(a); Teller v McCoy, 253 SE2d 114, 129–30 (W Va 1978).
93 At least one appellate court, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, has found
that rent escrow requirements that apply to rental arrears (as opposed to applying only
to ongoing rent that comes due after a case has been commenced) violate due process.
See Lucky Ned Pepper’s Ltd v Columbia Park and Recreation Association, 494 A2d 947,
953 (Md Spec App 1985). In Lucky Ned, the court considered a state law that required the
deposit of all arrears allegedly due as a condition of obtaining a jury trial. Id at 950. The
court held that the law erroneously presupposed that the rent withheld was in fact owed,
and therefore improperly interfered with the tenant’s right to a jury trial. Id at 951.
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to assert the warranty of habitability as a defense.94 Additionally, many tenants are unable to comply with the requirements
because they are using withheld rent to cope with the disrepair.95 Tenants spend money to make repairs on their own, to
pay for temporary fixes such as space heaters when the heat is
out or hot plates when the stove is not working, and to replace
damaged possessions.96 Commentators have pointed out that the
result of rent escrow laws is often that the tenants who need the
protections of the warranty of habitability the most become the
least likely to benefit from it.97
Third, some jurisdictions have imposed onerous notice requirements for assertion of a warranty claim.98 In their most
burdensome iterations, these rules require that notice to the
landlord of defective conditions be established through an official housing code violation report.99 Thus, if a tenant calls the
landlord about the condition of disrepair, talks to the landlord in
person, or even sends a letter describing the problem and the
landlord fails to make repairs, the landlord cannot be held liable. This requirement engrafts the same problems faced by code
enforcement systems onto the warranty of habitability. Where
code enforcement agencies are ineffectual and underresourced, a
warranty of habitability scheme tied to this system will face the
exact same limitations. Commentators have also remarked that
such requirements are misaligned with how tenants communicate with their landlords in practice.100
Multiple factors have motivated the enactment of these restrictive doctrines. To some extent, the doctrines reflect underlying hesitation about the establishment of the warranty of habitability.101 In some jurisdictions, legislatures and the public were
never fully supportive of establishing such an impactful set of
rights for tenants, and these doctrines were a way of limiting their
breadth. According to Professor David Super, rent escrow requirements in particular may be a way of “appeas[ing]” landlords
94

Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 435 (cited in note 19).
See id at 433 (noting that tenants may be forced to spend their rent money to
mitigate the damages caused by the landlord’s failure to repair); Franzese, Gorin, and
Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 36 (cited in note 19) (noting that tenants use withheld rent
“to make the essential repairs themselves in view of landlord intransigence”).
96 An unabated bedbug infestation, for example, will require tenants to buy new
bedding and furniture.
97 See Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 426 (cited in note 19).
98 See id; Myrah v Campbell, 163 P3d 679, 683 (Utah App 2007).
99 See, for example, Dugan v Milledge, 494 A2d 1203, 1206 (Conn 1985).
100 See Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 426 (cited in note 19).
101 Id at 424.
95
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unhappy with the recognition of the warranty.102 He observes that
where courts have recognized the warranty as a matter of common rather than statutory law, courts have been vulnerable to
landlords’ criticism of judicial overreach and therefore are more
willing to adopt restrictive doctrines.103 Courts and legislatures
have also enacted the restrictive doctrines as a mechanism to
protect against perceived tenant abuse of the warranty.104 By
imposing strict notice requirements, forcing tenants to escrow
their rent, or requiring a showing of good faith, courts and
legislatures believe that they are ensuring that only tenants
who genuinely withhold rent for bad conditions are benefiting
from the warranty. According to these courts and legislatures,
tenants who have failed to pay rent for a reason other than defective conditions should not be able to reap financial rewards
from the establishment of a right to rent abatement if they also
happen to satisfy the law’s requirements.105
II. EXISTING RESEARCH ON THE WARRANTY’S EFFECTIVENESS
AND THEORIES FOR TENANT UNDERUSE
Since the warranty of habitability was enacted nearly fifty
years ago, scholars have tried to understand whether the law
has lived up to the potential that advocates and proponents originally envisioned, and if it has not, why not.106 Multiple studies
102

Id at 428.
Id.
104 Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 425 (cited in note 19).
105 Id. See also Brakel, 5 Am Bar Found Rsrch J at 578 (cited in note 90); 280 Broad,
LLC v Adams, 2006 WL 2790909, *7 (Conn Super).
106 Whether the warranty of habitability actually aids low-income tenants has also
long been the subject of academic debate. See Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income
Redistribution Policy, 80 Yale L J 1093, 1179–81 (1971); Werner Z. Hirsch, Joel G.
Hirsch, and Stephen Margolis, Regression Analysis of the Effects of Habitability Laws
upon Rent: An Empirical Observation on the Ackerman-Komesar Debate, 63 Cal L Rev
1098, 1129–36 (1975); Duncan Kennedy, The Effect of the Warranty of Habitability on
Low Income Housing: “Milking” and Class Violence, 15 Fla St U L Rev 485, 496 (1987);
Neil K. Komesar, Return to Slumville: A Critique of the Ackerman Analysis of Housing
Code Enforcement and the Poor, 82 Yale L J 1175, 1192 (1973); Rabin, 69 Cornell L Rev at
580 (cited in note 18). The “mainstream” view believes that the increased costs imposed by
code requirements and the warranty of habitability are passed from landlords to tenants,
thereby hurting tenants (low-income tenants especially) in the long run. See Kennedy, 15
Fla St U L Rev at 497 (cited in note 106); Rabin, 69 Cornell L Rev at 558–59 (cited in note
18). However, the overall impact of habitability regulations on housing costs varies wildly
from study to study. See David Listokin and David B. Hattis, Building Codes and Housing, 8 Cityscape 21, 21 (2005) (finding that studies on the subject have claimed that building code regulations increase housing costs anywhere between 1 and 200 percent). Furthermore, some scholars—notably Professor Bruce Ackerman discussing his hypothetical
103
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show that tenants rarely assert the warranty as a defense in
nonpayment of rent eviction cases. Other studies show that very
few tenants receive rent abatements. These studies, however,
have limitations. The large-scale studies do not isolate cases of
tenants with meritorious claims, and thus leave unknown the
extent to which the outcomes constitute an operationalization
gap. The only study thus far that has measured outcomes among
cases with meritorious claims was conducted using a small sample size that does not purport to be representative. No study has
yet determined the size of the gap between the number of tenants with meritorious warranty claims and the number who
benefit from the law.
Leading scholarship on the warranty of habitability has
consistently attributed the apparent ineffectiveness of the law to
two factors: the lack of access to counsel, and onerous substantive doctrines (such as good faith withholding, rent escrow, and
strict notice requirements that restrict the claim’s use). Yet
these theories have not been subject to rigorous empirical scrutiny. The existing studies show that tenants who are represented by counsel are more likely to receive rent abatements, but
these studies have not controlled for whether tenants who are
represented are more likely to have meritorious claims. The
scholarship on the substantive doctrines, meanwhile, has been
largely theoretical in nature.
This Part provides an overview of the scholarship on the
warranty of habitability, describing (a) the existing empirical
studies on the law’s overall usage and effectiveness, (b) the research findings regarding the impact of legal counsel, and
(c) current explanations for the law’s apparent ineffectiveness.
A. Use and Effectiveness of the Warranty of Habitability
Marilyn Mosier and Richard Soble pioneered the empirical
scholarship on the warranty of habitability in the early 1970s
with a study of the Detroit landlord-tenant court in the years
immediately following Michigan’s enactment of the law.107
Through case file review and in-court observations, Mosier and
Soble found that rent abatements were awarded in an extremely
small percentage of the total number of nonpayment of rent

town of “Slumville”—have argued that code enforcement and the warranty of habitability
will help tenants without increasing their rents. See Ackerman, 80 Yale L J at 1177–86
(cited in note 106); Kennedy, 15 Fla St U L Rev at 499 (cited in note 106).
107 See Mosier and Soble, 7 U Mich J L Ref at 33 (cited in note 27).
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eviction cases.108 Specifically, they found that at most, rent
abatements were awarded in 2 percent of all nonpayment of rent
cases.109 Shortly after Mosier and Soble’s research was published, a team of Illinois-based researchers conducted a similar
study of Chicago’s eviction court and found that zero tenants in
the sample of cases they studied received rent abatements, even
though 41 percent of tenants had raised the warranty of habitability as a defense.110
Two more recent studies produced findings similar to those in
Mosier and Soble’s research. The first study was an observationbased study conducted by Professor Barbara Bezdek of a sample
of nonpayment of rent eviction cases in Baltimore in the early
1990s.111 Bezdek found that rent abatements were ordered in only 1.75 percent of all cases she observed.112 The second study reviewed court records of all nonpayment of rent eviction cases in
Essex County, New Jersey, in 2014.113 The authors, Professor
Paula Franzese, Abbott Gorin, and David Guzik, calculated the
overall frequency with which tenants formally raised the warranty as a defense.114 They found that the warranty was asserted
in the tenant’s answer in only 0.2 percent of all cases (80 out of
40,000).115 Based on these findings, Franzese and her colleagues
concluded that the warranty was significantly underutilized.116
108

See id.
See id. The study found that the full rent claim was excused in 0.7 percent of
contested nonpayment cases or 0.1 percent of all nonpayment cases, and it was partially
excused in 11.9 percent of contested nonpayment cases or 2 percent of all nonpayment
cases. However, these figures include cases in which the landlord received less than the
full amount of rent claimed for reasons other than a rent abatement in satisfaction of the
tenant’s implied warranty of habitability claim, including when the rent claimed had
been miscalculated and when the tenant had made all or partial payment. See id.
110 Fusco, Collins, and Birnbaum, 17 Urban L Ann at 109 (cited in note 27). One additional study conducted during the same time period produced similar findings. See Ben
H. Logan III and John J. Sabl, Note, The Great Green Hope: The Implied Warranty of
Habitability in Practice, 28 Stan L Rev 729, 744 (1976) (“During the period examined, the
implied warranty of habitability was pled as an affirmative defense in 56 cases constituting 4 percent of all unlawful detainer actions and representing 27 percent of all contested
unlawful detainer actions filed in that court for the 5-month period in question.”).
111 It is unclear whether this sample is a statistically significant representative
sample. See Bezdek, 20 Hofstra L Rev at 547 n 52 (cited in note 27). The study also involved court record review and exit interviews with litigants. Id at 547–48 n 53–54.
112 See id at 554. Rent was ordered into escrow in 4.3 percent of all cases.
113 See Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 20 (cited in note 19).
114 Id at 21.
115 Id.
116 Id at 22. This conclusion is based on the “far greater statistical likelihood that
significant housing code violations exist on leased premises in Essex County.” Id. The
authors do not state specifically what the statistical likelihood is that substandard
conditions exist in the premises. See id. They cite only to HUD data on the prevalence of
109
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These four studies measured the frequency with which the
warranty of habitability was asserted or won (in the form of a
rent abatement) within the total population of nonpayment of
rent cases. None measured this frequency against the population
of cases with meritorious warranty claims. Thus, the studies’
conclusions that the warranty is ineffective rest on the assumption that more tenants could have asserted or won the claim than
actually did so. It is unknown whether that assumption was
valid. Moreover, even if it was valid, the findings tell us little
about the size of the gap between the number of tenants with
meritorious claims and the number who benefited from the law.
The only study thus far that has sought to determine a tenant’s likelihood of benefiting from the warranty of habitability
when he or she has a meritorious claim is Professor Michele
Cotton’s “multi-case study” of fifty-nine rent escrow actions in
Baltimore.117 In these actions, tenants petition the court to have
their rent deposited into the court’s escrow account rather than
paid to the landlord based on violations of the warranty of habitability.118 Cotton found that less than half—42 percent—of tenants who had established entitlement to a rent abatement actually received one.119 However, Cotton’s study was based on a
small sample of cases that did not claim to be statistically representative of the population as a whole;120 thus, the conclusions
that may be drawn from the findings are limited.
These studies leave two significant gaps in our knowledge
about the use and effectiveness of the warranty of habitability.
First, no large-scale study has yet compared the number of cases
in which tenants benefit from the warranty against the number
of cases in which tenants have meritorious claims.121 Thus, we do
substandard housing conditions nationwide. Id at 5 n 11. One year later, in 2017,
Professors Karen Tokarz and Zachary Schmook published the results of a study that
looked broadly at outcomes in eviction cases in St. Louis, Missouri. See Tokarz and
Schmook, 53 Wash U J L & Pol at 176–78 (cited in note 86). While the study did not look
specifically at the frequency with which the warranty of habitability was raised, it found
that only 0.03 percent of cases resulted in judgments for the tenant whereas 77.5 percent
of cases resulted in judgments for the landlord (with the remainder of cases resulting in
dismissal). Id at 176. Based on these findings, the authors concluded that the warranty
of habitability is rarely used. Id at 186–87.
117 See Cotton, 19 CUNY L Rev at 62–63 (cited in note 28).
118 Id at 63.
119 Id at 72. Specifically, tenants received abatements in 42 percent of cases in
which they had established the elements required for this relief. Id.
120 Id at 62–64 (cited in note 28).
121 See Steinberg, 42 L & Soc Inquiry at 1072 (cited in note 22), noting that
[e]ven when a study demonstrates that one class of litigants—tenants, for example—routinely achieves unfavorable outcomes, it can be difficult to ascertain
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not know the extent to which the low usage rates reflect the
law’s ineffectiveness, or simply reflect low rates at which tenants have meritorious claims. No one has yet determined the
size of the operationalization gap. Second, the existing studies
leave open the possibility that tenants may benefit from the
warranty of habitability through outcomes other than rent
abatements.122 Tenants who settle their cases may elect to leverage their right to a rent abatement to negotiate a longer repayment period or avoid a possessory judgment in favor of the landlord. No studies have accounted for this possibility. Without
research that fills these gaps, we cannot properly reach a
conclusion about the extent to which tenants benefit from the
warranty of habitability.
B. Impact of Legal Representation
Very limited research exists on the impact of legal representation on the use of the implied warranty of habitability. Mosier
and Soble’s study of the Detroit landlord-tenant court found that
tenants who were represented by counsel were more likely than
unrepresented tenants to raise the warranty as a defense.123
They also found that represented tenants achieved overall better
outcomes in their cases as compared to unrepresented tenants.124
However, this study did not identify the extent to which the represented tenants were more likely to have warranty of habitability claims. It is possible, in other words, that lawyers chose tenants for representation because they had meritorious claims,
and thus that the higher usage of the claim and stronger outcomes simply reflect this selection bias.
The only other research that exists on the effect of counsel
has been embedded within two studies on the overall impact of
access to counsel in eviction cases.125 The first, a 1992 study on
whether the poor outcomes are the result of unmeritorious claims, or are due to
more problematic factors, such as lack of representation or structural unfairness
within the adjudicatory process.
122 The only exception is Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik’s research on the use of the
warranty of habitability as a tool to compel landlords to make needed repairs. See
Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 24–25, 30–31 (cited in note 19).
123 Mosier and Soble, 7 U Mich J L Ref at 45 (cited in note 27).
124 Id at 35. Anthony Fusco, Nancy Collins, and Julian Birnbaum’s study also found
that tenants who were represented by counsel achieved significantly better outcomes
than unrepresented tenants. See Fusco, Collins, and Birnbaum, 17 Urban L Ann at 115
(cited in note 27).
125 In addition, Professor Jessica Steinberg’s study of the impact of unbundled legal
aid found that tenants who were provided with unbundled legal services were significantly more likely to raise cognizable defenses as compared with unassisted tenants. See
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the impact of counsel in eviction cases in New York City, found
that rent abatements were awarded in 18.8 percent of cases in
which the tenant was represented by counsel, compared with
only 3.3 percent of cases in which the tenant was unrepresented.126 Tenants were randomly assigned to the treatment (offer of
representation) and control (no offer of representation) groups to
eliminate selection bias.127 However, there was no specific control for whether the tenants in each group had meritorious warranty of habitability claims at the same rate.
The second study, a more recent assessment of the impact of
access to counsel in eviction cases in Massachusetts, found that
monetary outcomes were significantly more favorable to the
tenant where the tenant was represented.128 These monetary
outcomes reflected rent abatements resulting from the warranty
of habitability, but also could reflect monetary damages awarded based on other claims129 or reductions in the rent owed due to
miscalculations or partial payment by the tenant.130 Like in the
1992 study, it was also unknown whether the treated (offer of
representation) and control (no offer of legal representation)
groups had meritorious warranty of habitability claims at the
same rate. No research has rigorously assessed the impact of
counsel on the use of the warranty of habitability while controlling for whether the tenant had a meritorious claim.

Steinberg, 18 Georgetown J Poverty L & Pol at 494 (cited in note 31). The study did not
isolate breach of warranty claims specifically. See id. Steinberg also found that full representation had a significant impact on the likelihood of the tenant receiving payments
from the landlord at the conclusion of the case, while unbundled legal assistance had no
positive effect on the tenant’s likelihood of receiving a payment from the landlord. See id
at 486. The study did not determine whether the payment reflected a rent abatement
based on the landlord’s violation of warranty of habitability or alternatively was based
on some other monetary claim. Id at 486–88.
126 Seron, Frankel, and Van Ryzin, 35 L & Soc Rev at 426 (cited in note 31).
127 All cases included in the study population had been determined as cases in which
the tenant was likely to benefit from legal support. See id at 423–24. This assessment
was based on the presence of defenses and claims (beyond only the warranty of habitability), as well as nonlegal characteristics of the tenant and case. Id.
128 Greiner, Pattanayak, and Hennessy, 126 Harv L Rev at 931 (cited in note 31).
129 Under Massachusetts law, there are numerous counterclaims available to tenants in nonpayment of rent eviction cases which carry monetary damages. See, for example, Mass Gen Laws Ann ch 93A, §§ 2, 9; Mass Gen Laws Ann ch 186, § 14 (lessor’s
obligation to furnish utilities); Mass Gen Laws Ann ch 186, § 18 (lessor’s obligation to
correct unsafe conditions upon notice); Mass Gen Laws Ann ch 186, § 15B (prohibition
against lessor on entering premises during lease term).
130 See Greiner, Pattanayak, and Hennessy, 126 Harv L Rev at 931 (cited in note 31).
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C. Explanations for the Law’s Ineffectiveness
There is a general consensus among scholars who have
studied the warranty of habitability that the law’s ineffectiveness is attributable to two main factors. First, scholars claim
that the ineffectiveness is a function of tenants’ lack of access to
counsel.131 Nearly all tenants in eviction proceedings are unrepresented; in some jurisdictions, as many as 94 percent of tenants
appear in court without counsel.132 Pointing to the research described in Part II.B, commentators argue that the overall lack of
access to counsel is responsible for the claim’s underuse.133 They
posit that unrepresented tenants do not have the knowledge,

131 See, for example, Mosier and Soble, 7 U Mich J L Ref at 62 (cited in note 27)
(“Another reason for the insignificant effect of the legislation on Detroit tenants is that
while the legislation augments a tenant’s possible defenses, it does not provide for representation of those tenants in court.”); Fusco, Collins, and Birnbaum, 17 Urban L Ann at
114–16 (cited in note 27) (emphasizing the importance of representation in determining
tenant outcomes); Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 31 (cited in note 19)
(proposing increased access to counsel as a solution to improve the effectiveness of the
warranty of habitability); Cotton, 19 CUNY L Rev at 83–84 (cited in note 28) (citing lack
of access to counsel as a barrier to effective assertion of the warranty of habitability).
132 See, for example, Boston Bar Association Task Force on the Civil Right to Counsel, The Importance of Representation in Eviction Cases and Homelessness Prevention *3
(Mar 2012), archived at https://perma.cc/PWL2-SWAW (determining that only 6 to
10 percent of tenants in Massachusetts are represented); Russell Engler, Connecting
Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal About When Counsel Is
Most Needed, 37 Fordham Urban L J 37, 47 n 44 (2010) (citing representation rates in
multiple jurisdictions); Maya Dukmasova, New Data Reveals Impact of Being Lawyerless
in Chicago Eviction Court (The Chicago Reader, Sept 14, 2017), archived at https://
perma.cc/M83U-V5XE (stating that only 12 percent of tenants in Cook County are represented); Charles Allen, Kenyan R. McDuffie, and Mary M. Cheh, Low-Income Tenants in
D.C. May Soon Get Legal Help (Wash Post, May 18, 2017), online at https://
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/all-opinions-are-local/wp/2017/05/18/low-income-tenants
-in-d-c-may-soon-get-legal-help (visited November 20, 2019) (Perma archive unavailable)
(stating that fewer than 10 percent of tenants in DC are represented). In New York City,
where a right to counsel law was recently enacted, the percentage of tenants represented
has risen from 1 percent before 2014 to 30 percent in in the final quarter of 2018. NYC
Human Resources Administration, Office of Civil Justice, Universal Access to Legal
Services: A Report on Year One of Implementation in New York City *4 (2018), archived
at https://perma.cc/43MV-H2DL.
133 See Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 13 (cited in note 19). But see
Cotton, 19 CUNY L Rev at 84 (cited in note 28) (noting that “[t]he lack of counsel means
that the parties are particularly dependent on the court to ensure that the rule of law is
applied”); id at 86–87 (arguing that advocates hoping to improve utilization of the implied
warranty of habitability should not focus their efforts on access to counsel because the
data suggest that all efforts thus far have faltered, and moreover the provision of additional lawyers would impose considerable resource demands on the courts); Bezdek, 20
Hofstra L Rev at 538 n 16 (cited in note 27) (arguing against solutions involving access to
counsel because it is “parentalistic [sic] and it lets us off the hook for our parts in the
charade of legal entitlement and rights vindication”).
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wherewithal, or resources required to effectively navigate the legal process in order to benefit from the warranty of habitability.134
Second, commentators argue that restrictive substantive
doctrines, namely rent escrow, good faith withholding, and onerous notice requirements, limit the claim’s usage.135 These
doctrines are not universal, but are becoming increasingly common across jurisdictions.136 Professor Super, a leading scholar on
the warranty of habitability, attributes the “fall” of the warranty
of habitability primarily to the spread of these rules.137 Writing
in the California Law Review in 2011, Super finds that these
“procedural obstacles have rendered the implied warranty of
habitability almost irrelevant in practice.”138 He argues that the
requirements are costly for tenants to comply with, are vulnerable to landlord abuse, and encourage tenants to move rather
than pursue their claims.139 While he acknowledges that data on
their impacts is lacking, he contends that these substantive limitations “likely are a significant contributor to the low rate of relief granted [for violations of the warranty of habitability] to
low-income tenants.”140 Franzese has likewise blamed these
rules for the ineffectiveness of the warranty, describing them as
a “practical bar to aggrieved tenants’ very assertion of the defense of breach of the warranty.”141

134 See Bezdek, 20 Hofstra L Rev at 538 (cited in note 27); Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 406–
07 (cited in note 19); Cotton, 19 CUNY L Rev at 66 (cited in note 28) (arguing that the legalese on pleadings acts as a barrier to unrepresented tenants asserting the warranty).
135 See Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 407 (cited in note 19) (drawing attention to the “littleappreciated substantive doctrines” that emerged after the law’s original enactment and
arguing that they have operated as major barriers to the warranty’s effectiveness);
Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 20–22 (cited in note 19) (arguing that
New Jersey’s rent escrow requirement is one of the primary reasons for their findings
regarding the low frequency with which the warranty is raised). On paper, the rent escrow requirement in New Jersey gives trial courts the discretion to order rent be paid
into escrow during the pendency of the eviction case. Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik found
that in practice, however, judges treat escrow hearings with little individualized attention, and as a matter of course order rent be deposited with the court, regardless of the
conditions of the premises. Id at 19–20, 37. The authors acknowledge that they do not
know whether their findings regarding the presence of the rent escrow requirement and
the low usage rates are correlative or causative. Id at 20. See also Tokarz and Schmook,
53 Wash U J L & Pol at 178 (cited in note 86).
136 See Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 425–29 (cited in note 19).
137 Id at 423–26.
138 Id at 423.
139 Id.
140 Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 432 (cited in note 19).
141 See Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 36 (cited in note 19).
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Scholars have also put forward other explanations for the
law’s apparent ineffectiveness.142 Super argues that tenants factor fears of retaliation into the “costs” of litigation; thus, to the
extent tenants anticipate landlord retaliation, they will be unlikely to assert their rights under the law.143 Most recently,
Franzese argued that the lack of centralized and accessible
housing code record databases prevents judges from effectively
enforcing the warranty.144 Franzese posited that the availability
of code enforcement data through such a database would both
inform the court’s analysis of the law and “would be a tool for
[the] government to reduce or withhold any rent subsidies until
the premises are restored to an inhabitable condition.”145 She
explicitly pointed to New York City’s centralized code violation
database as a model for other jurisdictions to follow.146
142 Since the warranty’s initial enactment, scholars have emphasized that entrenched power differentials between landlords and tenants, along with court cultures
that privilege landlords and stigmatize tenant litigants, act as significant barriers to the
law’s effectiveness. See Bedzek, 20 Hofstra L Rev at 571–72, 568 (cited in note 27)
(observing that in Baltimore, “the formal allocation of responsibilities between landlord
and tenant is effectively overwritten by the ‘tenant as deadbeat’ subtext which is reiterated by the court on behalf of the class of landlord litigants,” and arguing that “[i]n a jurisdiction with a functioning warranty of habitability, the subtext in tenant-claiming
cases would be: it is the landlord who has done wrong by failing to fulfill societally recognized obligations”); Cotton, 19 CUNY L Rev at 85 (cited in note 28) (“It may also be the
case that any uncertainty about the law that results in an environment of limited appellate guidance will be resolved against the less powerful party in the litigation, which in
this situation is the tenant.”); Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 451 (cited in note 19) (“[E]ither
abandoning or destabilizing courthouse culture could have resulted in much broader application of the implied warranty.”); Mosier and Soble, 7 U Mich J L Ref at 63 (cited in
note 27):

The disparities in help given to landlords and tenants and the treatment of
late landlords and tenants are an indication of the perhaps inevitable bias of
the court toward the landlord. Most of the judges and court personnel have a
middle-class background, and they have become familiar with many landlords
and attorneys appearing regularly in the court. The court had years of experience as a vehicle for rent collection and eviction where no defenses could be
raised.
Scholars have also highlighted the constraints that judges face in enforcing the laws.
Judges have large numbers of cases on their dockets and lack access to important factfinding tools and resources. See Cotton, 19 CUNY L Rev at 85–86 (cited in note 28).
143 See Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 408 (cited in note 19).
144 See Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 22 (cited in note 19).
145 Id.
146 Id at 36, 27 n 106 (noting that New York City has a Housing Code violation database that is publicly available online and that the Housing Court provides a computer
on each judge’s bench). An even more robust technology solution was urged by Professor
Mary Marsh Zulack nearly a decade prior. See Mary Marsh Zulack, If You Prompt Them,
They Will Rule: The Warranty of Habitability Meets New Court Information Systems, 40
John Marshall L Rev 425, 449–53 (2007). Specifically, Zulack proposed a computerized
system that would “prompt judges through repair-related information gathering,
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III. STUDY BACKGROUND AND DESIGN
This study sought to use rigorous methodological analysis to
assess the extent to which tenants who have meritorious warranty of habitability claims received benefits from the claim.147 It
also sought to rigorously evaluate the existing theories regarding the apparent ineffectiveness of the law, including the extent
to which legal representation affects tenants’ likelihood of receiving the law’s benefits. New York City was chosen as the site
for this study because, in addition to being the nation’s largest
rental market, it is located in a jurisdiction that lacks the substantive doctrines often blamed for the law’s failures. This legal
backdrop is ideal because it allows for disentanglement of the
various contributors to the claim’s underuse. This Part describes
the study’s objectives, context, data, and methodology.
A. Objectives
The overarching objectives of this study were twofold. First,
the study aimed to properly assess the effectiveness of the warranty of habitability through rigorous methods and statistical
analysis. While prior large-scale studies measured the overall
frequency with which tenants asserted the warranty of habitability as a claim or received rent abatements in nonpayment of
rent eviction cases, this study measured what I call the “operationalization gap”—the difference between the number of cases
in which the tenant has a meritorious warranty of habitability
claim and the number of cases in which the tenant receives some
benefit from that claim.148 It did so by identifying the cases in
which the tenant appears to have a meritorious claim based on
evidence of defective conditions in the unit.149 Moreover, while
retrieval, and adjudication steps.” Id at 425. Zulack predicted that such a system would
“lead[ ] efficiently to outcomes that link the application of the warranty of habitability
doctrine to real world improvements in rental premises.” Id.
147 New York City is also the nation’s largest rental market and one notorious for
substandard housing conditions. See note 21; Grace Ashford, Leaks, Mold and Rats: Why
New York City Goes Easy on Its Worst Landlords (NY Times, Dec 26, 2018), archived at
https://perma.cc/WVS7-6URQ.
148 The objective here is not to determine whether the outcome was “just,” but
whether tenants who appeared to have meritorious claims received the benefits the law
affords for those claims. See Paula Hannaford-Agor and Nicole Mott, Research on SelfRepresented Litigation: Preliminary Results and Methodological Considerations, 24 Just
Sys J 163, 178 (2003) (noting that “whether the litigant received a just or appropriate
outcome” is “one of the most difficult questions for which to formulate accurate and
reliable measures for empirical analysis”).
149 The data in this study showed that proper assertion of the warranty of habitability as a claim in the tenant’s answer was largely insignificant as a factor predicting
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prior studies have focused nearly exclusively on tenants’ use of
the warranty of habitability to achieve rent abatements, this
study also considered the possible use of the law to achieve other
beneficial case outcomes or to secure repairs.
Second, the study set out to rigorously evaluate the existing
theories regarding the warranty of habitability’s ineffectiveness.
As described previously,150 scholarship has consistently attributed the doctrine’s apparent failures to two factors: lack of access
to counsel and restrictive substantive doctrines. The scholarship, however, has been largely theoretical in nature; no studies
have yet subjected these factors to rigorous empirical scrutiny.151
This is the first study to do so. To understand the impact of
counsel, I compared outcomes of cases with meritorious claims
where tenants were and were not represented. To understand
the significance of the restrictive substantive doctrines, I assessed the extent to which tenants benefited from the warranty
of habitability in a jurisdiction (New York City) in which these
doctrines are absent. While this assessment does not allow for a
precise determination of the impact of the doctrines, it indicates
the extent to which we can properly attribute the warranty of
habitability’s ineffectiveness to them. In other words, the existing literature would predict that in jurisdictions where the restrictive doctrines do not exist, the warranty of habitability
would be widely used. I assess whether this prediction is
accurate. I also used the available data to glean insights into the
extent to which an accessible and centralized Housing Code
records database aids in judicial enforcement of the law.

whether the claim was used successfully. Approximately half of the tenants who received
rent abatements never actually asserted the claim. This finding is consistent with what
one would expect given liberal pleading amendment rules. These rules have the effect of
making actual amendments unnecessary in proceedings that usually resolve in relatively
expeditious out-of-court settlements, such as eviction proceedings, where it is understood
that the party could receive the amendment if leave was sought, and thus to avoid unnecessary litigation the parties treat the pleadings as if they were amended without actually going through the judicial procedures to do so.
150 See Part II.C.
151 See Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 20–22 (cited in note 19)
(citing to New Jersey’s rent escrow requirement as one of the primary reasons for their
findings regarding the infrequency with which the warranty is raised); Super, 99 Cal L
Rev at 432 (cited in note 19) (concluding that rent escrow laws “likely are a significant
contributor to the low rate of relief granted [for breach of the warranty of habitability] to
low-income tenants”); id at 441 (arguing that good faith requirements may make tenants
incapable of pursuing warranty of habitability claims).
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These objectives translated into four specific research questions that drove the analysis of the quantitative data:
(1) How often do tenants with meritorious warranty of
habitability claims receive rent abatements?
(2) To what extent do tenants with meritorious warranty of
habitability claims receive other benefits as a result of
the claim, such as a longer time period to pay rental
arrears or the avoidance of a possessory judgment?152
(3) To what extent is the warranty of habitability serving as
an effective tool to hold landlords accountable for
making necessary repairs?
(4) To the extent it exists, is the warranty of habitability’s
operationalization gap primarily a function of the lack of
legal representation?
B. Study Context
New York City was an optimal site for this study for multiple reasons. For one, New York’s warranty of habitability laws
lack the restrictive rules that previous scholarship has blamed
for the law’s ineffectiveness. Specifically, tenants are not required to deposit their unpaid rent into escrow, nor are they required to demonstrate that the reason for the nonpayment was
withholding of rent for defective conditions.153 Notice requirements are also liberal: tenants are never required to provide
notice in writing, let alone through the Code enforcement
agency.154 New York City also has a centralized and publicly accessible Housing Code record database that judges can easily
reference, which Professor Franzese predicts would aid in the
law’s enforcement.155 Analysis of the effectiveness of the warranty in this context provides crucial insight into whether the barriers traditionally cited to are in fact the primary culprits for the
law’s apparent ineffectiveness, or whether there are other,

152 For a detailed description of the meaning and significance of a possessory
judgment, see note 23.
153 See NY Real Prop Law § 235-b.
154 See Chapman v Silber, 760 NE2d 329, 334 (NY 2001) (stating that notice is adequate if the landlord “reserves the right to enter in order to inspect or to make [ ]
repairs”).
155 See Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 19, 22, 36, 38 (cited in note 19).
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perhaps less well-understood factors contributing to the outcomes commentators have observed. Additionally, the data
available in New York City allow for an assessment of the impact of counsel while controlling for the strength of the tenant’s
warranty of habitability claim. This assessment more accurately
indicates the impact of legal representation on the use of the
claim than any of the studies conducted previously.
A brief overview of New York’s warranty of habitability laws
and eviction procedures is necessary to contextualize the study
design and results. New York enacted the warranty of habitability through legislation in 1975.156 The statute, New York Real
Property Law § 235-b, provides that all residential leases,
whether written or oral, contain an implied covenant that the
premises be “fit for human habitation,” and that the tenants
“shall not be subjected to any conditions which would be dangerous, hazardous or detrimental to their life, health or safety.”157
As in most jurisdictions, it further provides that any attempt to
waive these obligations is void as contrary to public policy, and
that no expert testimony is needed to establish damages.158 A
landlord must have had actual or constructive notice of the conditions in order for a tenant to recover for breach of the warranty. Written notice can never be required, however, regardless of
156 See NY Real Prop Law § 235-b. This legislation followed a New York Appellate
Division case, Tonetti v Penati, 367 NYS2d 804 (NY App 1975), which laid the initial
groundwork for a warranty of habitability in New York. In Tonetti, a tenant argued that
he should be entitled to the return of his security deposit—even though he left an
apartment many months before the expiration of his lease—due to the overpowering
stench of dog urine. Id at 805. The Appellate Division agreed. The Tonetti court held, “It
is evident that the rationale behind the common-law rule, which likened a lease to the
sale of a chattel and therefore applied the ancient doctrine of caveat emptor, has no rational basis in a modern, urban society.” Id at 807. Senate Bill 3331B, which passed and
later became codified as New York’s Real Property Law § 235-b, represented a direct response to the case. See Kaplan v Coulston, 381 NYS2d 634, 635 (NY City Civ 1976).
157 NY Real Prop Law § 235-b(1). This provision has been interpreted to impose repair obligations on landlords where premises are not “fit for their intended purposes,”
and tenants have been “subjected to conditions which are dangerous to their life, health,
and safety.” See K.E.V. Realty Co, Inc v Kelly, NY L J 26, 27 (NY City Civ May 31, 1996).
158 See NY Real Prop Law § 235-b(2), (3)(a). Section 235-b(3)(b) provides that if the
failure to repair is caused due to a labor strike, and the landlord has made a good-faith
effort to cure the conditions, then the tenant cannot recover damages. Section 235-b(3)(c)
is designed to avoid double recovery for tenants in already-protected housing. Specifically, this section limits the recovery of tenants in housing subject to rent stabilization, rent
control, the “emergency tenant protection act of nineteen seventy-four [1974],” or “the
city rent and rehabilitation law.” NY Real Prop Law § 235-b(3)(c). The section states that
if a tenant living in one of these types of housing receives a rent reduction from the New
York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR), then the amount a
tenant recovers due to a landlord’s breach of the warranty of habitability must be reduced by the amount of this rent reduction. NY Real Prop Law § 235-b(3)(c).
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what is provided in the lease.159 As stated previously, New York
has no rent escrow or good faith requirements for the assertion
of the warranty of habitability.160 While the warranty can be asserted affirmatively, most tenants assert the claim as a defense
and/or counterclaim once a nonpayment of rent case is commenced against them.161
In recent years, approximately 200,000 nonpayment of rent
eviction cases have been filed annually in New York City Housing Court.162 Consistent with the eviction case resolution
processes nationwide, the overwhelming majority of such cases
are resolved through settlement agreements.163 Nearly all
settlements take the form of repayment agreements in which
the tenant agrees to pay the rental arrears owed within a stated
period of time.164 There are three key outcomes negotiated in a
repayment agreement. First, the parties negotiate the amount of
159

Kaplan, 381 NYS2d at 635.
Ocean Rock Associates v Cruz, 411 NYS2d 663, 663 (NY App 1978). The tenant
must allow the landlord to enter the premises to make repairs; a tenant’s refusal to allow
access provides a defense for landlords to damages for breach of the warranty of habitability. Fifty-Seven Associates, LP v Feinman, 2011 WL 749255, *1 (NY Sup). However, a
landlord cannot merely assert a good faith defense by attempting (and failing) to cure:
because the warranty of habitability reflects a contractual obligation, courts interpret
the breach strictly. Joseph v Varna Trust, NY L J 32 (NY City Civ Feb 13, 2003).
161 Tenants in New York City generally do not bring affirmative warranty of habitability claims where they face conditions of disrepair; they instead bring Housing Part
(HP) actions. See Dennis E. Milton, Comment, The New York City Housing Part: New
Remedy for an Old Dilemma, 3 Fordham Urban L J 267, 270 (1975). A designated section
of the Housing Court adjudicates HP actions. Any time a landlord violates or appears to
have violated New York City’s Housing Maintenance Code or the New York City Civil
Court Act, a tenant can initiate an HP action. Id.
162 See NYC Human Resources Administration, NYC Office of Civil Justice 2017
Annual Report and Strategic Plan *19, archived at https://perma.cc/CYR4-A3MD. In
2016, the year this study was conducted, there were 202,300 nonpayment cases filed.
The number of nonpayment cases filed has steadily decreased since 2013. Eviction cases
brought for reasons other than nonpayment of rent, such as termination of the tenancy
or violation of the lease, are considered “holdover[s].” In 2016, there were 31,584
holdover cases filed. A total of 22,089 eviction cases resulted in actual eviction that year,
but the percentage breakdown between holdovers and nonpayment cases is unknown.
See id at *19–20.
163 In this study, less than 1 percent of nonpayment of rent evictions went to trial. For a
discussion of the widespread practice across jurisdictions of resolving eviction cases through
“hallway negotiations,” see Engler, 37 Fordham Urban L J at 47 (cited in note 132).
164 The data in this study showed that 22 percent of all nonpayment cases in which
the tenant appeared were resolved through a settlement agreement in which the landlord agreed to discontinue the case (presumably because all the arrears had been paid or
otherwise accounted for). One percent of cases resulted in settlement agreements in
which the tenant agreed to move out, 0.5 percent resulted in dismissal (presumably because of a procedural or other type of defect), and 8 percent resulted in a default judgment. Cases that resulted in a discontinuance, move out agreement, or default judgment
were excluded from the analysis unless otherwise indicated.
160

2020]

The Limits of Good Law

179

money that must be repaid. Any rent abatement granted to the
tenant will be incorporated into this amount.165 Where a rent
abatement is granted, the agreement will reference the abatement explicitly.166 Second, the parties negotiate the length of
time for repayment. If the tenant repays the amount owed by
the deadline, the tenancy will be reinstated. Third, the parties
negotiate whether the agreement will include a judgment for
the landlord.167 What occurs if the tenant misses a payment
under the agreement depends on whether the agreement contained a judgment for the landlord. If the agreement includes a
165 The size of a rent abatement is measured by the diminution of value of the premises, in other words, by calculating the difference between the value of the premises in
good repair and the value of the premises in their defective condition. This difference is
then multiplied by the length of time for which the defective conditions existed, from the
time of notice to the landlord to the time of repair. Rent abatements may also be awarded at an abatement hearing held by a judge prior to the full trial. Because very few cases
go to trial, few abatement hearings are held. All abatements awarded after a hearing
were included in the data coding, analysis, and results. The amount of arrears claimed
by the landlord may also be reduced for other reasons such as improper rental overcharges, the attribution of arrears to a public housing authority responsible for making
Section 8 payments, or for other monetary claims asserted by the tenant.
166 The rent abatement and its purpose (to satisfy the tenant’s warranty of habitability claims) are almost always expressly stated because landlords want to ensure that
tenants cannot seek to recover on the claims again in a subsequent settlement agreement in the same case, or in a separate court proceeding. To check for the possibility that
settlement agreements included “hidden” abatements, I also coded for two settlement
outcomes that could be equivalent to a rent abatement: a promise to pay rental arrears
in an amount of $7,000, $9,000, or $11,000, and agreements that prospectively set the
rent. In 2016, $7,000 $9,000, and $11,000 were the maximum arrears amounts that City
voucher programs (respectively) would pay when granting a tenant a new voucher. A
tenant who is facing eviction for nonpayment of rent and cannot afford the rent going
forward may apply for and receive the voucher if the amount of rent he or she owes is no
greater than the particular amount ($7,000, $9,000, or $11,000, depending on the program). When the City grants the voucher, it will also pay off those arrears. The possibility thus exists that instead of granting a rent abatement explicitly, a landlord may satisfy the tenant’s warranty claims by agreeing to reduce the total arrears to either $7,000,
$9,000, or $11,000 so that the tenant can qualify for the voucher. Similarly, a landlord
may satisfy the tenant’s claims by agreeing to a future rent amount that is lower than
the legal rent (known as a “preferential rent”) or the rent he or she would otherwise
charge (if unregulated), rather than expressly granting an abatement. However, the coding revealed that both of these outcomes were extremely rare—they existed in the cases
of less than 1 percent of tenants with meritorious warranty claims. Because the outcomes were so rare and it remains ambiguous whether they even truly reflect a rent
abatement awarded for the tenant’s warranty of habitability claims—landlords could
have other reasons for wanting their tenants accepted into the voucher program or for
setting a prospective rent in the settlement agreement—I did not count these cases as
having rent abatements for the purpose of the data analysis.
167 It is generally understood that these latter two outcomes—amount of time to pay
and whether a judgment issues—operate in an inverse relationship in negotiations.
Thus, the landlord will agree to a stipulation without a judgment and a shorter period
of time to pay the arrears, or a stipulation with a judgment and a longer period of time
to pay.
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judgment, the landlord is authorized to evict the tenant immediately upon the tenant’s breach of the agreement terms. If the
agreement does not include a judgment, the landlord must file a
motion seeking the court’s permission to go forward with the
eviction.
Oftentimes, cases will include multiple settlement agreements. Where the tenant fails to pay the arrears by the deadline
in the first agreement, either the tenant or the landlord can
bring the case back to court. The tenant most likely would do so
to seek an extension of time to pay. The tenant can also do so
where the landlord has failed to comply with orders to make repairs. The landlord would bring the case back to court to seek
authority for an eviction where a judgment was not awarded in
the initial settlement agreement and the tenant failed to pay by
the required deadline.168 Although parties have the option to
have a hearing before the judge in all of these scenarios, the result will most frequently be a subsequent repayment agreement
with a new deadline.169
The eviction case procedures provide numerous opportunities for tenants to assert that repairs are needed in their units
and for judges to order those repairs. The pro se answer form,
used by virtually all tenants who submit an answer, provides as
168 Where a tenant fails to pay by the payment deadline and the stipulation includes
a judgment, the tenant will file a post-judgment “Order to Show Cause” seeking a stay in
the execution of the eviction. See Orders to Show Cause (New York State Unified Court
System), archived at https://perma.cc/E63G-MSDR. Orders to Show Cause are liberally
granted, and thus landlords tend to agree to a settlement allowing for a new deadline for
the payment of the arrears. Where the original settlement stipulation does not include a
judgment, the landlord will file a motion for issuance of the judgment and the execution
upon the tenant’s failure to pay by the payment deadline. Such a motion will also typically resolve in a subsequent settlement stipulation, this time including a judgment,
with a new payment deadline. These subsequent settlement stipulations are allocated in
the same manner as initial settlement stipulations, and thus will include provisions requiring the performance of repairs with the same regularity.
169 There are two general standards for the granting of orders to show cause in New
York City Housing Court. First, if the order to show cause will grant merely a stay of
execution for an eviction, there is wide judicial discretion in determining whether or not
to grant the order—the court will grant the order if that is determined to be “just.” See
NY CPLR § 2201. See also Joseph v Cheeseboro, 248 NYS2d 969, 971 (NY City Civ 1964)
(stating that the standard for granting such orders is “the court’s own sense of discretion, prudence, and justice”), revd on other grounds, 251 NYS2d 975 (NY Sup 1964).
However, if the order to show cause will lead to vacatur of the judgment for eviction, a
different standard prevails. In such cases (which generally result from a default judgment against the tenant), the party bringing the order to show cause must show that the
default was “excusable default.” See NY CPLR § 5015(a)(1). A showing of excusable default has two components that the tenant must show: “a reasonable excuse for defaulting
and a meritorious defense to the proceeding.” East 168th Street Associates v Castillo, 79
NYS3d 485, 489 (NY City Civ 2018).
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one of the standardized response options that repairs or services
are or were needed in the unit.170 Judges also ask tenants
whether repairs are needed as part of the judge’s review of the
settlement agreement.171 Wherever the tenant states that repairs are needed, the judge will require that the agreement include a provision obligating their performance. The agreement
will enumerate the specific defective conditions and will provide
“access dates” on which the repairs will be made. This process is
repeated for each settlement agreement in the case.
Judges also have tools to verify the presence of defective
conditions in the tenant’s unit. The Housing Code enforcement
database, maintained by the New York City Department
of Housing Preservation and Development (“HPD” or “the Code
enforcement agency”), is publicly accessible online and is
searchable by unit. This database includes a multiyear history
of the complaints made, inspections performed, and violations
issued for each unit. All judicial benches are equipped with
desktop computers and wireless Internet, allowing judges to
easily access the available data. Judges also have the authority
to order the Code enforcement agency to perform Housing Code
inspections.172
C. Data
Two distinct datasets were constructed for this study. The
first dataset was a statistically significant random sample of all
170 The pro se answer form is a checkbox form that tenants complete orally at the
Housing Court clerk’s window. The form asks tenants whether “[t]here are or were conditions in the apartment and/or the building/house which the Petitioner did not repair
and/or services which the Petitioner did not provide.” Civil Court of the City of New
York, Answer in Writing and Verification (Form CIV-LT-91b) (May 2013), archived at
https://perma.cc/L72Z-ERBH. This plain language wording is distinct from the legalese
often used in pro se pleading forms in other jurisdictions. See Cotton, 19 CUNY L Rev at
66 (cited in note 28) (noting that the pro se pleading form in other jurisdictions asks tenants to “state whether they want relief based on violation of the ‘warranty of habitability’
and the ‘covenant of quiet enjoyment,’ terms which have no meaning to these tenants or
even most lay people”). The pro se answer form used in New York City Housing Court
does not provide space for tenants to specify which repairs are needed. Thus, as described in the text accompanying note 191, cases are never identified as having a meritorious warranty of habitability claim based solely on the assertion of needed repairs in
the Answer.
171 An allocution is a judge’s review of the stipulation with an unrepresented party
to ensure that the party enters into the stipulation freely and voluntarily and understands the terms to which he or she is agreeing. Because questions about repairs are
part of judges’ standardized allocutions, many landlord attorneys will ask tenants if repairs are needed and will include repair obligations in the stipulation voluntarily.
172 See, for example, Judicial Request/Order for Housing Inspection, Beaumont
Management Group, LLC v Jackson, LT-021832-16/BX, *5 (NY City Civ 2016).
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nonpayment of rent eviction cases filed in 2016173 in which the
tenant appeared.174 The dataset was built using the New York
Office of Court Administration’s comprehensive database of all
eviction case filings.175 This Office of Court Administration database identified the index number, case type (nonpayment of rent
or “holdover”176), and whether the tenant appeared or defaulted
for each case filed.177 Approximately ninety-seven thousand cases satisfied the inclusion criteria.178 From these 97,000 cases,
746 index numbers were randomly selected using a data randomization generation tool. The selection was stratified in order
to account for borough-level differences in the data.179 Seven
hundred and forty-six cases is a representative sample of the total study population at a 90 percent confidence interval, with a
margin of error of 3 percent and a response distribution of
50 percent.180 The files for all 746 cases were retrieved from the

173 2016 was the most recent year for which complete case data was available during
the time period this study was conducted (May–October 2018). Many cases filed in 2017,
particularly those filed in the latter half of the year, were still ongoing in 2018.
174 A tenant appears by filing an Answer at the Housing Court clerk’s office. Cases
in which the tenant defaulted were excluded because a default judgment generally precludes the tenant from asserting claims and defenses. Even where a tenant is successful
in removing a default judgment at a later stage in the case, the tenant typically negotiates at a weakened bargaining position and thus does not have the same leverage to invoke the warranty of habitability. See Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at
21 (cited in note 19) (“The entry of a default judgment against a tenant who does not (or
cannot) appear in court limits that tenant’s range of options and all but closes the window of opportunity for consideration of viable defenses and alternatives to dispossession.”). Inclusion of cases with default judgments in the study would have muddied the
data, causing the findings to reflect both the structural barriers to usage and the lack of
availability of the claim due to the default. Since the goal of the study was to assess the
structural barriers to usage, defaulted cases were excluded.
175 The NYU Furman Center was provided this database by the Office of Court
Administration pursuant to a data use agreement that restricts usage to certain
research purposes.
176 See note 162.
177 This dataset also included other information; however, the only data used for
this study were the index number, case type, and appearance of the tenant. This data
was used only to determine the size of the total study population and to identify a
random representative sample of cases.
178 A total of 202,300 nonpayment of rent eviction petitions were filed in 2016. See
note 162. Thus, the tenant defaulted in over half of all the nonpayment proceedings.
179 A stratified sample is one that is proportional to certain differentiating criteria.
Thus here, the number of cases from each borough in the sample was proportional to the
number of cases from that borough in the total dataset. The sample was a 0.5 percent
stratified sample.
180 The margin of error states the amount of random sampling error in a study’s results. The confidence interval is a type of interval estimate that might contain the true
value of an unknown population parameter. The associated confidence level quantifies
the level of confidence that the parameter lies in the interval. The response distribution

2020]

The Limits of Good Law

183

Housing Court, scanned, and coded according to criteria and
guidelines described below. The unit-level addresses for these
cases were also matched with the HPD Housing Code enforcement database. This matching allowed each case to be linked to
the unit’s Housing Code complaint and violation history.
The second dataset was a random sample of all nonpayment
of rent eviction cases filed in 2016 in which the tenant appeared
and in which one or more “hazardous” or “immediately hazardous” Housing Code violations were open at the unit at the time
the case was filed.181 This dataset was constructed by matching
the Office of Court Administration database with the HPD
Housing Code violation database at the unit level.182 The matching identified 1,553 cases. From these 1,553 cases, 507 case index numbers were randomly selected using a data randomization generation tool. The selection was stratified in order to
account for any borough-level differences in the data. Five hundred and seven cases is a representative sample of the total
study population at a 90 percent confidence interval, with a
margin of error of 3 percent and a response distribution of
50 percent. The files for all 507 cases were retrieved from the
New York City Housing Court, scanned, and coded according to
the same criteria and guidelines described below.
D. Methodology
The case files in both datasets were coded across seventeen
different criteria. A detailed description of the coding guidelines
is provided in the Appendix. The criteria included whether the
tenant was represented;183 whether the Answer asserted needed
repairs; the outcomes of the first settlement agreement, including whether a possessory judgment entered, whether a rent
abatement was awarded, and the length of time provided to the
is the probability distribution of the response (target) variable. Fifty percent is the most
conservative choice for the response distribution, yielding the largest sample size.
181 “Hazardous” Housing Code violations are classified as “Class B” level violations
and “immediately hazardous” violations are classified as “Class C” level violations. See
note 24.
182 The Office of Court Administration dataset included the unit-level address for
each case filed. For each Housing Code violation, the HPD dataset included the unitlevel address, the dates the violation was open and closed, and the violation classification level (A, B, or C). The HPD data did not include information for violations at properties owned by the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA)—in other words, public
housing—and thus the matched dataset used for this study was not inclusive of nor can
it be taken to reflect outcomes involving NYCHA units.
183 Representation status was coded based on whether the tenant was represented
when he or she entered into the first settlement agreement in the case.
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tenant to repay the arrears;184 whether the first and any subsequent settlement agreements required the landlord to perform
“substantial repairs”; whether the judge ordered a Housing Code
inspection; and whether the judge had accessed the Housing
Code enforcement records of the unit.185 “Substantial repairs”
were defined as repairs of a condition sufficiently serious to constitute a violation of the warranty of habitability.186
1. All nonpayment cases dataset.
The first dataset—which I will refer to as the “all nonpayment cases” dataset—constituted a representative sample of all
nonpayment of rent eviction cases in which the tenant had the
ability to pursue claims and defenses.187 Within this dataset, cases were grouped based on whether the tenant had a meritorious

184 These outcomes were only recorded for the first settlement agreement because
this agreement reflects what is generally the only substantive negotiation in the case. A
subsequent agreement (other than a discontinuance) will only occur if a tenant has defaulted on the first agreement, and thus a tenant in that posture is in a weakened negotiating position. A tenant in that posture will also typically have waived defenses and
claims in the first agreement, particularly if judgment has entered.
185 The pro se Answer form provides an option for tenants to assert that repairs are
needed in their apartments. See note 170. The form does not prompt tenants to specify
which repairs are needed. Settlement agreements, by contrast, nearly always specify the
repairs to be performed where they require repairs.
186 Repairs of all conditions issues that qualify as rent impairing pursuant to NY
Multiple Dwelling Law § 302-a were included as “substantial repairs.” All conditions
that have been found to constitute a violation of the warranty of habitability were also
included. These include, inter alia: lack of heat and/or hot water, see Parker 72nd
Associates v Isaacs, 436 NYS2d 542, 544 (NY City Civ 1980); flooding, see Spatz v
Axelrod Management Co, Inc, 630 NYS2d 461, 463–64 (NY City Civ 1995); fumes and
smoke, see Goldman v O’Brien, NY L J 28 (NY Sup Aug 14, 2000); leaking gas, see
Goodman v Ramirez, 420 NYS2d 185, 188 (NY City Civ 1979); lead paint, see Chase v
Pistolese, 739 NYS2d 250, 252–53 (NY City Ct 2002); bedbugs, see Jefferson House
Associates, LLC v Boyle, 2005 WL 465171, *3 (NY Just Ct); mold, see 360 West 51st
Street v Cornell, NY L J 28 (NY Civ Ct Sept 6, 2005), affd, 831 NYS2d 634, 635 (NY Sup
2007); broken appliances (for example, refrigerator or stove), see Rosewohl Enterprises,
LLC v Schiffer, 2006 WL 1981750, *1 (NY Sup); cockroaches, see 501 New York LLC v
Anekwe, 2006 WL 3859077, *1 (NY Sup); secondhand smoke, see Poyck v Bryant, 820
NYS2d 774, 777 (NY City Civ 2006); mice and/or rats, see Northwood Village, Inc v Curet, NY L J 34 (NY Dist May 6, 1998); noise and/or dust, see Mantica R Corp NV v
Malone, 436 NYS2d 797, 800 (NY City Civ 1981); failure to install kitchen facilities, see
Varna Trust, NY L J at 32; and broken locks, see Jangla Realty Co v Gravagna, 447
NYS2d 338, 341 (NY City Civ 1981).
187 The tenant had the ability to pursue claims and defenses in these cases because
the tenant filed an Answer. A tenant who does not file an Answer defaults and, in most
instances, will receive a default judgment. Although it is possible to defend a case after
receiving a default judgment, a tenant in this posture will not have the same opportunity
to pursue claims and defenses as a tenant who appears. See note 168.
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warranty of habitability claim.188 Cases were assigned to the
comparison group wherenre all available information indicated
that the tenant had not experienced conditions of disrepair sufficient to establish a warranty of habitability claim.189 Specifically,
cases were assigned to the comparison group where the tenant
did not assert repairs in the Answer, there were no substantial
repairs included in the settlement agreement, and there were no
open “hazardous” (Class B) or “immediately hazardous”
(Class C) code violations at the unit at the time the case was
filed.190 Thirty-four percent of all nonpayment of rent cases met
these conditions. I refer to this group as the “no meritorious
claim” group.
Cases were assigned to the meritorious claim group based
on the presence of factors indicating that the tenant had experienced serious conditions of disrepair, and thus likely could have
established a warranty of habitability claim. These factors included (1) the assertion that repairs were needed in the tenant’s
Answer; (2) the inclusion of substantial repairs in the initial settlement agreement; and (3) the inclusion of substantial repairs
in multiple settlement agreements. Some evidence of conditions
of disrepair was present in the majority of nonpayment of rent
cases. In half (50 percent) of all nonpayment of rent cases, tenants asserted that repairs were needed in their Answer to the
complaint.191 Slightly over half (51 percent) of cases included

188 Some cases did not fall into either classification because it was ambiguous
whether the tenant had a meritorious warranty of habitability claim. These cases were
excluded from the analysis.
189 The available information, however, did not provide insight into whether the
tenant had suffered conditions of disrepair sufficient to constitute a violation of the warranty of habitability at an earlier time in his or her tenancy. Thus, there may have been
some cases included in the comparison group that were cases in which the tenant had
the ability to pursue a warranty of habitability claim.
190 All three conditions were required to be met for a case to be assigned to the comparison group. Cases in which needed repairs were asserted in the Answer but in which
substantial repairs were not included in the settlement agreement were not included in
either group because it was ambiguous whether the tenant had a meritorious warranty
of habitability claim. These cases were excluded from the analysis.
191 It is unknown to what extent the tenants’ assertions may have been untruthful—
tenants could have, for example, invoked the claim without basis because they believed it
would bolster their defense. To assess for this possibility, I compared the frequency with
which tenants asserted needed repairs in their Answer with the frequency with which
tenants claimed a service defect, which was offered as another checkbox option on the
standardized form. A service defect is in some ways a stronger defense to an eviction case
than a warranty of habitability claim—where a tenant has not been properly served, the
court has no jurisdiction and the case must be dismissed. Yet only 10 percent of tenants
claimed this defense. This finding suggests that tenants were not simply checking every
box that could be beneficial to their case, and thus supports the truthfulness of tenants’
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substantial repairs in the initial settlement agreement. There
was not perfect overlap between cases in which repairs were asserted in the Answer and imposed in the settlement agreement—only 36 percent of cases met both conditions. There are
two potential explanations for this finding. First, the Answer
does not specify which repairs are needed, and thus in a certain
percentage of cases the repairs claimed were likely insubstantial. Second, new repair needs may have arisen between the filing of the Answer and the settlement agreement, and thus some
settlement agreements may have included substantial repairs
that were not needed at the time of the Answer.192 Overall,
10 percent of cases had repairs asserted in the Answer and substantial repairs included in multiple settlement agreements.193

assertions of needed repairs. Moreover, research in other jurisdictions has found that tenants’ allegations of conditions of disrepair are generally valid. In a longitudinal study of
seventy-three landlord-tenant cases in a housing court in Washington, DC, Professor
Steinberg found that “98 percent of [landlords] later subject to housing inspections were
deemed responsible for at least one housing code violation.” Steinberg, 42 L & Soc Inquiry at 1079 (cited in note 22). The primary purpose of this housing court, known as the
Housing Conditions Court, is to address substandard housing. Id at 1064–66.
192 The average length of time between the Answer and the settlement agreement
was twenty-one days.
193 This figure is likely relatively low in part because many cases do not involve
multiple settlement agreements.
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TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF ALL NONPAYMENT OF RENT
EVICTION CASES
Evidence of conditions of disrepair

Percentage of
nonpayment of
rent eviction cases
50%
51%

Need for repairs asserted in Answer
Substantial repairs in settlement
agreement*
Repairs asserted in Answer and substantial repairs in settlement agreement
Repairs in Answer and substantial
repairs in multiple settlement
agreements*
No evidence of conditions of disrepair**
* One of two “meritorious claim” groups
** “No meritorious claim” group

36%
10%
34%

The group of cases with meritorious warranty of habitability
claims—which I will refer to as the “meritorious claim” group—
was configured and tested using two different definitions:
(1) cases in which the settlement agreement required the landlord to make substantial repairs (Definition 1), and (2) cases in
which multiple settlement agreements required the landlord to
make substantial repairs and the tenant asserted that repairs
were needed in his or her Answer (Definition 2).194 The criteria
included in Definition 1 were more inclusive but less confident
indicators of a meritorious warranty of habitability claim,
whereas the criteria used in the second definition were less inclusive but more confident indicators.195 In the Definition 2
194 Cases were only included in the “meritorious claim” group where the conditions
requiring repairs, as stated in the settlement stipulation, were sufficient to constitute a
warranty of habitability violation. Thus, where a settlement stipulation required a landlord to repair only a minor condition that did not affect habitability, the case was not included in the “likely meritorious warranty claim” group.
195 The first group includes all cases in which it was likely that the tenant had a
meritorious warranty of habitability claim. Virtually all cases (over 99 percent of cases
in the “all nonpayment of rent eviction cases” dataset) result in a settlement stipulation,
and the inclusion of substantial repairs in the stipulation likely indicates that the tenant
had a meritorious claim. However, there is a possibility that the tenant was lying by saying repairs were needed, or that perhaps the tenant had not notified that repairs were
needed prior to the settlement discussion. Thus, this definition could be overly inclusive
by encompassing cases in which the tenant did not have a meritorious claim. The second
group includes cases in which there was a near certainty that the tenant had a meritorious claim. If the tenant stated that repairs were needed in his or her Answer and the
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group, cases were included only if two or more settlement
agreements required repairs of the same conditions and the access dates in the first agreement had passed by the date of the
second agreement.196
2. Violation dataset.
The second dataset—which I will refer to as the “violation
dataset”—constitutes a representative sample of cases in which
one or more “hazardous” (Class B) or “immediately hazardous”
(Class C) Housing Code violations were open at the unit at the
time of filing. These are cases in which there was an even
stronger indication that the tenant had a meritorious warranty
of habitability claim. Conditions of disrepair that constitute
Class B or Class C violations nearly always affect habitability,197
and the open status of the violation indicates both that the landlord had notice of the condition of disrepair and that the landlord likely had not yet completed repairs.198 This dataset thus
landlord agreed to make substantial repairs in not one but two or more settlement stipulations, we know that the landlord had notice of the conditions and failed to make repairs. Moreover, the tenant’s persistence in asserting the conditions and the need for repairs suggests a low probability of falsification. However, the use of this definition is
likely to exclude cases in which the tenant has a meritorious claim. Many cases resolve
with only one settlement stipulation, and it is possible that some tenants are not asked
or do not know to mention that repairs are needed when they file their Answer.
196 The goal of using these criteria was to identify cases in which the landlord appeared to have shirked his or her obligations to repair in the first agreement. Where the
landlord had shirked such obligations, there is a strong likelihood that the tenant had a
meritorious warranty of habitability claim because the landlord was on notice and failed
to make the necessary repairs. It is unknown in these cases, however, if the failure to
repair was the result of the tenant’s refusal to provide access.
197 Conditions that qualify as Class C violations include, inter alia, rodents and inadequate supply of heat or hot water. Conditions that qualify as Class B violations include, inter alia, inoperable smoke detectors, mold, and vermin issues. Ninety-five percent of the cases included in the violation dataset had at least one open Class C
violation.
198 In order for a violation to be closed (often referred to as “certified”), there must
be a determination that the violation has been corrected. Prior to the deadline for correcting the violation (twenty-four hours for a Class C violation, thirty days for a Class B
violation, and ninety days for a Class A violation), a landlord may self-certify the violation as corrected by mail or through an online system. Once the deadline for correction of
the violation has passed, a landlord must submit a dismissal request to the Code enforcement agency (the Department of Housing Preservation and Development, or
“HPD”). Upon the filing of a dismissal request, an inspection will be conducted and the
housing inspector will deem the violation corrected when so warranted. Certain violations require the submission of documentation along with the request for dismissal.
Where a violation has been open for longer than twelve months and no new violations
have been issued during that time period, the landlord can apply for a voluntary
reissuance of the violation and may then self-certify the violation as corrected by the
newly established deadline for correction. See New York City Department of Housing
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comprised a third meritorious claim group. At times, subsets of
the violation dataset were also used to test results among
groups of cases with even stronger evidence of a meritorious
warranty of habitability claim. Thus, outcomes were analyzed
for subgroups of violation cases where the tenant had also asserted that repairs were needed in the Answer, substantial repairs were included in the settlement agreement, and/or substantial repairs were included in multiple settlement
agreements.
The purpose of the violation dataset was primarily supplemental, as the cases included likely comprise only a small fraction of all nonpayment of rent cases in which the tenant had a
meritorious warranty of habitability claim. Many tenants do not
report defective conditions to the City, or do so only once their
landlord has repeatedly failed to make repairs.199 Thus, the “all
nonpayment cases” dataset provides a more comprehensive representation of the use of the warranty of habitability across all
nonpayment of rent eviction cases. The violation dataset is included to respond to potential concerns that the methodology
used to identify cases with meritorious warranty of habitability
claims in the first dataset are overly inclusive, and thus that the
findings are diluted. Each case included in the violation dataset
had on average 3.7 Class C violations, 0.5 Class B violations,
and 1.3 Class A violations open at the time of case filing, totaling 5.5 open violations per case.200 Ninety-five percent of cases in
the dataset had one or more open Class C violation.

Preservation & Development, Violation Removal—Overdue Violations *4–10 (Mar 2017),
archived at https://perma.cc/8UME-89DQ. It is possible that in some cases included in
this dataset, the violation had been corrected but the landlord had not yet undertaken
the appropriate procedures to close the violation. It is also possible that there were some
cases with uncorrected Class B and Class C violations at the time of case filing that were
not included in the dataset because the landlord had falsely certified the violations as
corrected. See generally Ashford, Leaks, Mold and Rats (cited in note 147) (reporting
instances of false correction certifications by landlords).
199 See generally New Settlement Apartments’ Community Action for Safe Apartments (CASA) and the Community Development Project (CDP) at the Urban Justice
Center, Tipping the Scales: A Report of Tenant Experiences in Bronx Housing Court (Mar
2013), archived at https://perma.cc/MB6A-BN7M. Oral or written notice to the landlord
is sufficient to satisfy the notice requirement of a warranty of habitability claim. See
note 154.
200 Repairs were asserted in the Answer in 71 percent of violation cases, and substantial repairs were included in the settlement agreement in 68 percent of violation
cases. In 19 percent of violation cases, substantial repairs were included in multiple settlement agreements, and in 16 percent of violation cases, substantial repairs were included in multiple settlement agreements and repairs were asserted in the Answer.
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Using both datasets, Welch’s two-sample t-tests and
Pearson’s chi-squared tests were performed to compare case
outcomes among the three “meritorious claim” groups and the
“no meritorious claim” group. As described in more detail below,
outcomes compared included rent abatements, the rate of possessory judgments, the length of the repayment period, and orders to perform repairs.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This Part provides the results of the statistical analysis and
discusses the answers they provide to the four specific research
questions. The analysis revealed that many more tenants had
meritorious warranty of habitability claims than received any
benefit from the claim. A small percentage of tenants with meritorious claims received rent abatements; no tenants, however,
received other benefits, such as longer repayment periods or
avoidance of a possessory judgment, as a result of having a meritorious claim. And while settlement agreements very frequently
imposed repair obligations, it appears that those obligations
most often went unfulfilled and unenforced. The lack of legal
representation accounted somewhat for the findings but was
insufficient to fully explain them.
Parts IV.A and IV.B provide the results of the statistical
analysis for the three types of case outcomes studied: rent
abatements, possessory judgments, and length of time for payment of the arrears. Part IV.C provides the same for the data related to the enforcement of repair obligations, and Part IV.D provides the results of the analyses regarding legal representation.
A. Question 1: To What Extent Do Tenants Who Have
Meritorious Warranty of Habitability Claims Receive Rent
Abatements?
The data analysis revealed that tenants who had meritorious warranty of habitability claims rarely received rent abatements. Rent abatements were granted in only 1.75 percent of all
nonpayment of rent eviction cases, even though between 36 and
51 percent of the tenants in the study had meritorious claims.
Put differently, a tenant with a meritorious warranty of habitability claim had between a 2.35 and 3.29 percent chance of
receiving a rent abatement generally, and a 9 percent chance
if there were open code violations in the unit. Even using the
most conservative set of indicators to identify cases with meritorious warranty claims—cases in which there were open code
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violations, the tenant asserted repairs in the Answer, and substantial repairs were included in multiple settlement agreements—only 15 percent received rent abatements. In sum, the
overwhelming majority of tenants who were entitled to rent
abatements did not receive them. A detailed description of the
statistical findings is provided below.
1. All nonpayment of rent cases.
Rent abatements were awarded in 1.75 percent of all nonpayment of rent cases (13 out of 745).201 The percentage rose only slightly when calculated within cases with evidence of conditions of disrepair. Tenants were awarded rent abatements in
3.5 percent of cases with repairs asserted in the Answer. Of cases in which substantial repairs were included in the first settlement agreement, 2.35 percent were awarded rent abatements,
and of cases in which substantial repairs were included in the
settlement agreement and repairs were asserted in the Answer,
3.29 percent were awarded abatements. Abatements were
granted in 2.76 percent of cases in which repairs were asserted
in the Answer and substantial repairs were included in multiple
settlement agreements. No abatements were awarded in the
control group. The average abatement amount was $1,955.
These results are presented in Table 2 below.

201 For an explanation of how I coded the awarding of a rent abatement, see the
Appendix.
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TABLE 2: RENT ABATEMENTS IN ALL NONPAYMENT OF
RENT CASES
Case Classification
Abatement Rate
All cases
1.75%
Repairs in Answer
3.5%
Substantial repairs in
2.35%
settlement agreement*
Repairs in Answer and
3.29%
substantial repairs in
settlement agreement
Repairs in Answer and
2.76%
substantial repairs in multiple
settlement agreements*
No conditions of disrepair**
0%
* One of two “meritorious warranty claim” groups
** “No meritorious warranty claim” group
2. Violation cases.
Rent abatements were awarded in 9 percent of all violation
cases, even though the tenants in all such cases had meritorious
claims. The rate of rent abatements did not increase substantially even where additional evidence existed of conditions of disrepair. Tenants were awarded rent abatements in 10 percent of
cases in which the tenant has asserted that repairs were needed
in his or her Answer. Of cases in which substantial repairs were
included in the first settlement agreement, 13 percent were
awarded rent abatements, and of cases in which substantial repairs were included in multiple settlement agreements, the
same share—13 percent—were granted abatements. Abatements were awarded in 15 percent of cases in which repairs
were asserted in the Answer and substantial repairs were included in multiple settlement agreements. The average abatement amount in the violation dataset was $2,275. These results
are presented in Table 3 below.
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TABLE 3: RENT ABATEMENTS IN VIOLATION CASES
Case Classification
All violation cases
Repairs in Answer
Substantial repairs in
settlement agreement
Repairs in Answer and
substantial repairs in
settlement agreement
Repairs in Answer and multiple
settlement agreements

Abatement Rate
9%
10%
13%
13%
15%

3. Discussion.
The data revealed that tenants received rent abatements at
very low rates even where there were multiple indicators that
they had meritorious warranty of habitability claims. The findings showed a large operationalization gap as measured by the
award of a rent abatement: only between 2.35 and 9 percent of
tenants who had a meritorious warranty of habitability claim
actually benefited from that claim. At minimum, these findings
show that the warranty of habitability is not operating in practice as it is designed on paper: to condition rental obligations on
repairs. Instead, most tenants—approximately ninety-eight out
of one hundred—are being held to their full rental obligations
regardless of defective conditions. The result is that landlords
are rarely facing financial consequences for neglecting their
properties.
The data also showed that tenants were most likely to receive rent abatements when there were open code violations in
the unit. Tenants were substantially less likely (approximately
one-half to one-quarter as likely) to receive abatements when
there was other evidence of conditions of disrepair but no code
violations. This finding is striking. Although code violations provide proof of the existence of conditions of disrepair, a primary
motivation for enacting the warranty of habitability was to provide an alternative to code enforcement for holding landlords accountable for conditions of disrepair. Courts, advocates, and legislators believed that by giving tenants the power to act as
“private attorney[s] general” to enforce habitability standards,
the warranty would function as an important work-around to
often inefficient and poorly resourced housing code enforcement

194

The University of Chicago Law Review

[87:145

systems.202 But to the extent the warranty of habitability provides meaningful relief only where the Code enforcement system
has been activated, as is indicated by this data, the law is not
serving this purpose.
B. Question 2: To What Extent Do Tenants with Meritorious
Warranty of Habitability Claims Receive Other Benefits
from the Claim, Such as a Longer Time Period to Repay
Rental Arrears or the Avoidance of a Possessory Judgment?
The data also ruled out the possibility that tenants with
meritorious warranty of habitability claims receive benefits from
the claim other than rent abatements. As described above, the
other key outcomes negotiated in a nonpayment of rent eviction
case are (1) whether a possessory judgment is awarded to the
landlord,203 and (2) the length of the repayment period afforded
to the tenant. The analyses of both datasets showed that there
was no statistically significant difference in either of these case
outcomes between cases with and without meritorious warranty
of habitability claims. Tenants with meritorious warranty
claims were statistically just as likely to receive a possessory
judgment as tenants without warranty claims.204 In cases in
which possessory judgments were awarded, there was no statistically significant difference in the length of the repayment period. Similarly, in cases in which no possessory judgment was
awarded, there was no statistically significant difference in the
length of repayment period.205 Thus, tenants did not appear to be
“trading” the opportunity for a rent abatement for other types of
desirable outcomes in their cases. A detailed description of the
statistical findings is provided below.

202 See Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 12 (cited in note 19); notes
44–53 and accompanying text.
203 For a detailed description of the meaning and significance of a possessory
judgment, see note 23.
204 Tenants were slightly less likely to receive possessory judgments in cases in
which there were open code violations, but this finding was not statistically significant.
205 The length of repayment period is compared separately for cases with and without possessory judgments because these two outcomes are typically negotiated in an
inverse relationship with each other—tenants who wish to avoid a judgment can typically do so in exchange for a shorter repayment period, whereas tenants who prefer a longer
repayment period can typically achieve this by agreement to a possessory judgment. See
note 167.

2020]

The Limits of Good Law

195

1. All nonpayment of rent cases.
Among “no meritorious claim” cases, 74 percent had possessory judgments and the average length of time for repayment of
arrears was 37.6 days. Where a case had a possessory judgment,
the average length of time for repayment was forty-two days,
whereas when the case did not have a possessory judgment, the
average repayment period was twenty-four days. As described
in Part III.D.1, two different sets of criteria were used to identify the “meritorious warranty claim” group within the “all nonpayment of rent cases” dataset: (1) cases with substantial repairs in the settlement agreement (Definition 1), and (2) cases
with substantial repairs in multiple settlement agreements and
repairs asserted in the Answer (Definition 2). Among cases satisfying the criteria under Definition 1, 73 percent had possessory judgments and the average length of time for the repayment
of the arrears was 39.3 days. Where a case had a possessory
judgment, the average length of time for repayment was fortyfour days, whereas when a case did not have a possessory judgment, the average repayment period was twenty-six days.
Among cases satisfying the criteria under Definition 2,
75 percent had possessory judgments and the average length
of time for repayment of arrears was forty days. Where a case
had a possessory judgment, the average length of time for
repayment was forty-four days, whereas when a case did not
have a possessory judgment, the average repayment period was
twenty-nine days.206
206 In a significant share of cases (22 percent), the settlement agreement was an
agreement to discontinue the case (a “discontinuance”) rather than a repayment agreement. A discontinuance generally results where the tenant has paid the entirety of the
rent owed. The likelihood of a tenant receiving a discontinuance did not appear to be affected by the presence of a warranty of habitability claim. In fact, the likelihood of receiving a discontinuance was lower among tenants who appeared more likely to have
meritorious warranty of habitability claims as compared with tenants who did not. The
discontinuance rate among tenants with repairs asserted in their Answer was
20 percent, compared with 25 percent among tenants without repairs asserted in the
Answer. The discontinuance rate in all violation cases was 19 percent. Among tenants
with substantial repairs asserted in their settlement agreement, the discontinuance rate
was 13 percent as compared with 35 percent among tenants with no repairs included in
their settlement agreement. The latter disparity—and the low discontinuance rate when
repairs were included in the settlement in particular—may exist because judges do not
consistently perform allocutions of the settlement agreement where the agreement is a
discontinuance. Thus, many tenants who needed substantial repairs may not have had
the opportunity to include those repairs in their settlement. Nevertheless, the comparison among cases with and without repairs asserted in the Answer and violation cases
indicates that tenants with likely warranty of habitability claims did not appear to be
using their claims to achieve discontinuances.
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Welch’s two-sample t-tests and Pearson’s chi-squared tests
were performed to test for statistical significance in the difference in outcomes between the “no meritorious claim” cases and
each of the two “meritorious warranty claim” case groups. There
was no statistically significant difference in outcomes between
the “no meritorious claim” comparison group and either of the
two “meritorious warranty claim” group. The full statistical results are reported in Tables 4 and 5 below.
2. Violation cases.
Sixty-four percent of violation cases had possessory judgments. The average length of time for repayment of arrears
among all violation cases was 36.4 days. The average repayment
period was 42 days for cases with possessory judgments, and 26
days for cases without possessory judgments.
Pearson’s chi-squared and Welch’s two-sample t-tests were
performed to test for statistical significance in the difference in
outcomes between the violation cases and the “no meritorious
claim” cases (in the “all nonpayment cases” dataset). The results
showed no statistical significance in the average length of repayment period or in the rate of possessory judgments. The average length of the repayment period also did not differ at a level of statistical significance when the issuance of a possessory
judgment was held constant. Specifically, the repayment period
was the same in violation cases with possessory judgments and
“no meritorious claim” cases with possessory judgments. There
was also no statistically significant difference between violation
cases without possessory judgments and “no meritorious claim”
cases without possessory judgments. The full statistical results
are reported in Tables 4 and 5 below.
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TABLE 4: POSSESSORY JUDGMENT RATE IN ALL NONPAYMENT OF
RENT AND VIOLATION CASES
Case classification

Percentage of
cases with
possessory
judgment for
landlord
73%

P-value207 based on
difference with no
meritorious claim
group

Substantial repairs in
0.78
settlement agreement*
Repairs in Answer and
75%
0.91
multiple settlement
agreements*
Violation cases
64%
0.09
No conditions of
74%
—
disrepair**
* One of two “meritorious claim” groups among all nonpayment of rent cases
** “No meritorious claim” group

207 The p-value, or probability value of asymptotic significance, indicates the level of
statistical significance of the outcome. P-values less than or equal to 0.05 indicate statistical significance, whereas p-values greater than 0.05 indicate that the outcome is not
statistically significant.
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TABLE 5: AVERAGE LENGTH OF REPAYMENT PERIOD IN ALL
NONPAYMENT OF RENT AND VIOLATION CASES
Case classification

Substantial
repairs in
settlement
agreement*

Repayment
period

P-value based on
difference with no
meritorious claim
group [95% Confidence Interval]
0.18
0.16
[−4.5, 0.9] [−4.3, 0.7]

With
39.3
44
possessory
days days
judgment
Without
26
possessory
days
judgment
Repairs in
With
40
44
0.17
Answer and possessory
days days
[−5.5, 1.0]
multiple
judgment
settlement
Without
29
agreements* possessory
days
judgment
Violation
With
36.4
42
0.37
cases
possessory
days days
[−1.3, 3.6]
judgment
Without
26
possessory
days
judgment
No
With
37.6
42
—
conditions of possessory
days days
disrepair**
judgment
Without
24
possessory
days
judgment
* One of two “meritorious claim” groups among all
nonpayment of rent cases
** “No meritorious claim” group

0.29
[−6.8, 2.0]
0.34
[−3.9, 1.3]
0.17
[−11.3,
2.1]
0.80
[−1.8, 2.3]
0.41
[−5.7, 2.4]
—
—

3. Discussion.
This research is the first to address the possibility that tenants with meritorious warranty of habitability claims are benefiting from the claim by achieving favorable case outcomes other
than rent abatements. It effectively rules out this possibility.
While tenants with open code violations at their units were
slightly more likely to avoid possessory judgments as compared
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with tenants without warranty claims, this difference was small
and not statistically significant. Moreover, such tenants still
“paid” for this avoidance of the judgment with a shorter repayment period, equal to that awarded to tenants without warranty
claims who also avoided a possessory judgment.208 The achieved
benefit was therefore minimal.
These findings, together with the rent abatement findings,
indicate that the vast majority of tenants with meritorious warranty of habitability claims did not receive any material benefit
from the claim. The small percentage of tenants who received
rent abatements indeed comprised the only tenants with likely
meritorious warranty claims who benefited from the law at all.
In other words, between 2.35 and 9 percent of all tenants who
should have been able to invoke the law were able to successfully do so. The warranty of habitability did not provide any benefit
at all to approximately 91 to 97 percent of tenants who appeared
to satisfy the elements of the claim.
C. Question 3: Does the Warranty of Habitability Serve as an
Effective Tool to Hold Landlords Accountable for Making
Needed Repairs?
It is possible that although most tenants are unable to successfully invoke the warranty to achieve rent abatements or
other beneficial outcomes in their eviction cases, they are effectively using the law as a tool to compel landlords to perform
needed repairs. The settlement agreements in slightly over half
of all nonpayment of rent cases included an order obligating the
landlord to make substantial repairs, which would seem to indicate that the law is being used in this way.209 Yet the fact that
the settlement agreement included such an obligation does not
necessarily mean that the landlord complied with it and made
the repairs.
The data do not allow for conclusions to be drawn regarding
the extent to which repairs were ever completed once they were
ordered in settlement agreements. However, cases that have

208 It is also possible that the difference in the rate of possessory judgments is
attributable to differences in preferences between tenants with code violations and those
with no conditions of disrepair. To the extent tenants with code violations are genuinely
withholding rent and have saved the money, they may be more likely to prefer an outcome comprised of a shorter repayment period and no possessory judgment rather than
one comprised of a longer repayment period and the award of a possessory judgment.
209 Settlement agreements in cases that were converted to holdovers were excluded
from this analysis.
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multiple settlement agreements provide insight into the extent
to which repair orders are followed. Cases result in more than
one settlement agreement when a tenant fails to comply with
the repayment terms set forth in the initial settlement agreement.210 The landlord then takes the next step toward eviction,
and either the landlord or the tenant will bring the case back to
court.211 The parties will then enter into a new settlement
agreement, typically a repayment agreement.212 If applicable,
that agreement will again include an order for the landlord to
make any necessary repairs.
Among cases that have (1) repairs ordered in the initial settlement agreement, and (2) a subsequent settlement agreement
entered into after the “access dates” included in the initial settlement agreement, the frequency with which the same repairs
are included in a subsequent settlement agreement provides
some indication of the extent to which repair orders are followed. Specifically, where a case has two or more settlement
agreements and the first agreement included an order for the
landlord to make repairs, the fact that the same repairs are ordered in a subsequent settlement agreement (entered into after
the access dates for repairs in the first agreement have passed)
strongly suggests that the landlord did not comply with the initial repair order.213 Conversely, where a case has two or more

210 In theory, a case could also have multiple settlement agreements because the
landlord failed to make the ordered repairs and the tenant brought the case back to
court on that basis. However, virtually none of the cases included in either sample involved multiple settlement agreements for this reason. It is also unlikely that there is a
selection bias such that cases that have multiple settlement agreements are more likely
to be those in which the landlord failed to make repairs. Obligations in settlement
agreements for a tenant to repay arrears and for a landlord to make repairs are not construed as mutually dependent, and thus a landlord’s failure to make repairs is not
grounds for the tenant to fail to comply with his or her repayment obligations. Thus, a
tenant electing to not make her arrears payment because of the landlord’s failure to
comply with its repair obligations would essentially be subjecting herself to the possibility of immediate eviction without the benefit of the warranty of habitability as a defense.
211 If the initial settlement agreement includes a possessory judgment for the landlord, the landlord’s next step toward eviction will be to issue a warrant of eviction. The
tenant will then have to file an order to show cause to bring the case back to court. If the
initial settlement agreement does not include a possessory judgment for the landlord,
the landlord’s next step toward eviction will be to file a motion in court seeking a judgment and issuance of a warrant of eviction. This motion will bring the case back to court.
212 In some cases, either or both of the parties will choose to go before the judge for a
hearing rather than enter into a new settlement agreement. Such cases were excluded
from the analysis described in this Section.
213 It is possible that tenants are lying and saying that repairs are still needed after
the repairs have already been completed. However, there does not appear to be an incentive for tenants to make such a misrepresentation. Tenants are not excused from their
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settlement agreements and the first agreement included an order for the landlord to make repairs, the fact that the same repairs are not ordered in a subsequent agreement (entered into
after the access dates for repairs in the first agreement have
passed) strongly suggests that the landlord complied with the
initial repair order. Thus, the frequency of each outcome was
calculated to determine the extent to which landlords comply
with repair orders included in settlement agreements. The findings indicate that repair orders were not complied with in nearly
three-quarters of all cases where the data allow for this analysis.
Two other case activities serve as additional indicators of
the extent to which the warranty of habitability is effectively
used to improve housing quality within eviction cases: the frequency with which judges order Housing Code inspections, and
the frequency with which judges access Housing Code enforcement records.214 As described in Part III.B, judges presiding over
nonpayment of rent eviction cases have broad authority to order
the Housing Code enforcement agency to perform an inspection
of the unit.215 This authority is significant because it allows
judges to use the information they gather through eviction cases
regarding conditions to trigger a parallel enforcement system.
Where a tenant reports that she does not have heat, for example,
the judge’s order of a Housing Code inspection means that if the
tenant’s report is accurate, the Housing Code enforcement agency will initiate its own action against the landlord to ensure the
repair is made. The landlord’s obligation to repair thus will no
longer be tied to the eviction case, nor will it depend on the tenant’s ability or willingness to enforce the judge’s repair order.216
repayment obligations, nor do they receive any other direct benefits, as a result of the
landlord’s failure to comply with the repair order.
214 See Steinberg, 42 L & Soc Inquiry at 1083–84 (cited in note 22) (highlighting the
“housing inspector’s central role in prompting landlords to repair housing code
violations,” in part through their roles as fact finders, in the context of the Housing
Conditions Court in Washington, DC).
215 Although the form judges use to solicit a Housing Code inspection of a unit is
termed a “Judicial Request/Order for Housing Inspection,” in practice an inspection is
always scheduled once a judge completes the form. Thus, I describe this authority as the
authority to “order” a Code inspection, although technically speaking the authority is to
“order or request” a Code inspection. See note 172.
216 If a landlord does not make a repair as ordered in an eviction case settlement
agreement, the tenant must bring the failure to repair to the court’s attention for a judge
to enforce the order. There are many barriers to the effectiveness of this enforcement
mechanism: tenants may not be aware of or know how to bring the failure to the court’s
attention; tenants may fear retaliation if they choose to bring the failure to the court’s
attention; and tenants may not want to risk keeping their eviction case open (by bringing
the failure to the court’s attention) if they continue to owe the landlord rent.
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Judges also have the ability to access Code enforcement records, which include the history of complaints, inspections, and
violations issued within the prior year. The ability to obtain
these records is significant because it means that the judge has
access to external, objective information about the conditions of
the tenant’s unit, which, as Professor Franzese argues, should
help promote enforcement of the warranty of habitability.217 The
availability of the database also means that a judge can easily
know whether the Housing Code enforcement agency is already
aware of or involved in the conditions in the tenant’s unit. A
judge who is concerned about a tenant’s report of serious conditions of disrepair can know whether it is worth ordering a Code
inspection, or whether doing so would be duplicative because the
agency is already involved. In other words, this integration
should help encourage judges’ appropriate use of their authority
to order Housing Code inspections.
Despite the integration of the Code enforcement and Housing Court systems, the data show that judges rarely use these
tools to enforce the warranty and promote repair issues in the
tenant’s unit. The full results of the analyses are reported and
described below.
1. All nonpayment of rent cases.
In nonpayment of rent cases in which substantial repair orders were included in the original settlement agreement and the
parties entered into a subsequent settlement agreement after
the access dates in the original settlement agreement had
passed, the subsequent agreement included the same repair obligations 72 percent of the time.218 Judges invoked their authority to order a Housing Code inspection in only 1.2 percent of all
nonpayment of rent cases. Perhaps even more striking, such an
inspection was ordered in only 0.4 percent of cases in which substantial repairs were included in the settlement agreement
where there were no open Housing Code violations at the time of
case filing or complaints made to the Code enforcement agency
within six months prior to the filing.

217

See Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 27 (cited in note 19).
It is not possible to tell from the data the extent to which repairs are not performed because the tenant does not provide access on the agreed upon dates.
218
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2. Violation cases.
In violation cases in which substantial repair orders were
included in the original settlement agreement and the parties
entered into a subsequent settlement agreement after the access
dates in the original agreement had passed, the subsequent
agreement included the same repair obligations 80 percent of
the time. Judges invoked their authority to order a Housing
Code inspection in only 1.8 percent of all violation cases. At the
same time, there is little evidence that judges were aware of
open Housing Code violations in the unit. A printout of the
online record of the Code enforcement history of the unit was included in the case file in only 5.7 percent of cases, even though
there were open Code violations in every case included in this
dataset.219
While judges may have accessed the Code enforcement database and not printed out a paper copy of the record for the file,
circumstances suggest that such behavior would be unlikely. For
one, it is typically court attorneys (attorneys who assist the
judge in the courtroom) who access online records, and a
printout of the record would be the most likely method of presenting the record to the judge. Second, it makes logical sense
that judges (through their court attorneys) would print out and
preserve the record once they have accessed it. Complete eviction case file records exist only in hard paper copy, rather than
in any electronic database, and thus in the context of this system, the practical action for judges to take upon accessing an
online record related to a case would be to add it to the paper
file. Moreover, cases tend to involve multiple court appearances,
and thus judges who accessed this record would likely want to
remind themselves of the record in a later court appearance.
Thus, the finding that a paper copy of the Code enforcement record was in the file in only 5.7 percent of cases likely reflects the
frequency with which the judge indeed accessed the record.220
3. Discussion.
These findings strongly suggest that the warranty of habitability is not serving as an effective tool to compel the performance

219 Records of Housing Code violations are accessible through a centralized public
online database.
220 This outcome was not measured in the “all nonpayment of rent cases” dataset
because very few of those cases had open code violations in the unit, and thus it would
have been difficult to interpret the meaning of the rate there.
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of needed repairs. In the overwhelming majority of cases in
which repairs were ordered in settlement agreements, it appears
that landlords did not in fact follow through on their obligations.
To be sure, it is unknown to what extent landlords later complied
with their obligations even though they did not comply on the
scheduled access dates. However, the fact that between 72 and
80 percent of repairs appeared to have not been performed on the
scheduled access dates strongly suggests that landlord’s repair
obligations are not being effectively enforced in the course of
nonpayment of rent eviction cases.
The findings also indicate that judges rarely utilized the
tools available to them to hold landlords accountable for needed
repairs. Judges invoked their authority to order Housing Code
inspections in only a tiny share of cases, despite tenants’
frequent reporting of serious conditions of disrepair. Had they
done so, they would have triggered an overlapping enforcement
system that should have then provided an additional layer of
landlord accountability. Thus, even if the Housing Court judges
were not able to unilaterally enforce habitability laws, they
would have activated a system that perhaps could do so more
effectively. However, judges did not follow this path.
Judges also rarely took advantage of the opportunity to
learn the Housing Code enforcement history at the unit. In the
violation dataset, judges accessed the Code enforcement history
only 5.7 percent of the time. Thus, nearly 95 percent of the time
that there were code violations at the unit, the judge was likely
unaware of this fact (or did not have the full information regarding which violations were still outstanding and which had been
cleared). This finding further indicates that judges’ failure to
frequently order Housing Code inspections was not simply a response to their awareness that the Code enforcement agency
was already involved with the unit. Rather, the finding suggests
that judges generally are not aware of code violations that exist
in tenants’ units, and yet still decline to order code inspections
when tenants report defective conditions.
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D. Question 4: To the Extent It Exists, Is the Warranty of
Habitability Operationalization Gap Simply a Result of the
Lack of Legal Representation?
The data showed that legal representation substantially
affected tenants’ ability to benefit from the warranty of habitability.221 Represented tenants with meritorious warranty of habitability claims were at least nine times more likely than unrepresented tenants with meritorious claims to receive a rent
abatement.222 Except where there were open code violations in the
unit, unrepresented tenants virtually never received abatements
when they had meritorious claims. Approximately one in four
represented tenants, meanwhile, received abatements when they
had meritorious claims, whether identified based on either of the
two sets of criteria in the “all nonpayment cases” dataset or the
presence of open code violations. These findings strongly suggest
that the lack of legal representation is an important contributor
to the operationalization gap that has been detected.
However, the findings also show that the lack of legal representation does not fully account for the operationalization gap.
Although rent abatements were much more frequent where tenants had legal counsel, rent abatements were not the norm in
meritorious claim cases even among cases in which the tenant
was represented. Most represented tenants—approximately
three-quarters—with meritorious warranty of habitability
claims did not receive rent abatements, even when they had
open code violations in their units. These findings suggest that
factors beyond the lack of access to counsel are also responsible
for the operationalization gap.
As a preliminary matter, Pearson’s chi-squared tests were
performed to test for selection bias in representation—that is,
whether lawyers were choosing cases for representation based

221 These findings should be interpreted with some caution, as this study did not
involve the randomized assignment of representation. The cases compared have equally
strong evidence of warranty of habitability claims; however, it is possible that there are
other factors that led counsel to accept some cases and not others. For example, counsel
may have selected cases based on the presence of other claims and defenses, or because
of the willingness of the tenant to participate in the case. However, to the extent these
factors affected the selection of cases for representation, the results are likely biased
upward so as to overestimate the impact of legal representation.
222 The length of repayment periods and the rate of possessory judgments were not
compared because the sample size among represented tenants was too small to obtain
results with statistical significance.
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on the strength of the warranty of habitability claim.223 In the
“all nonpayment cases” dataset, the tenant was unrepresented
by counsel in 91 percent of all nonpayment cases, and represented by counsel in 9 percent of cases. To test for selection bias,
I first looked at whether represented cases were more likely to
include substantial repairs in the settlement agreement. The
results showed that there was no statistically significant difference among the rate at which repairs were included in settlement agreements between represented and unrepresented
cases.224 Next, I looked at whether represented cases were more
likely to assert needed repairs in the Answer and/or to include
substantial repairs in multiple settlement agreements. The results showed that the incidence was exactly the same—
11 percent—where the tenants were represented and unrepresented. Pearson’s chi-squared tests again showed that there was
no statistically significant difference between these rates. Thus,
these results indicate that it is unlikely that lawyers were selecting cases for representation based on the presence of a meritorious warranty of habitability claim; overall, tenants had meritorious warranty claims at the same rate whether they were or were
not represented. The full results are reported in Table 6 below.

223 It is unknown to what extent the substantial repairs needed in the represented
versus unrepresented cases were equivalent. Thus, it is possible that counsel were
selecting for cases with more serious needed repairs, or for cases where more evidence
existed documenting the severity of the repairs and notice to the landlord.
224 Specifically, substantial repairs were included in the settlement agreement in
51 percent of unrepresented cases and 53 percent of represented cases.
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TABLE 6: PRESENCE OF CONDITIONS OF DISREPAIR IN
REPRESENTED VERSUS UNREPRESENTED CASES
Evidence of
conditions of
disrepair
Substantial
repairs in
settlement
agreement
Substantial
repairs in
multiple
settlement
agreements
and repairs in
Answer
No conditions
of disrepair

Incidence in
represented
cases
53%

Incidence in
unrepresented
cases
51%

P-value

11%

11%

0.84

31%

23%

—

0.61

A similar analysis was performed to test for selection bias in
the violation dataset. In this dataset, the tenant was unrepresented by counsel in 79 percent of cases and represented by
counsel in 21 percent of cases. To test for selection bias in representation, Welch’s two-sample t-tests compared the number of
open violations in unrepresented versus represented cases. Cases in which the tenant was represented had an average of 1.5
Class A, 0.6 Class B, and 4.3 Class C violations open at the time
of case filing. Cases in which the tenant was unrepresented had
an average of 1.3 Class A, 0.4 Class B, and 3.6 Class C violations
open at the time of case filing. The differences between these
two groups, compared separately for each code violation class
level, also were not statistically significant. These findings
strongly suggest that counsel did not select cases for representation based on the number or severity of open code violations in
the unit at the time of case filing. The full statistical results are
reported in Table 7 below.
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TABLE 7: OPEN CODE VIOLATIONS IN REPRESENTED VERSUS
UNREPRESENTED CASES

Class A
Class B
Class C

Number of
open violations
in represented
cases
1.5
0.6
4.3

Number of open
violations in
unrepresented
cases
1.3
0.4
3.6

P-value

0.43
0.51
0.07

1. All nonpayment cases.
Pearson’s chi-squared tests were performed to test for differences in the rate of rent abatements among represented and
unrepresented tenants with meritorious warranty claims. The
results revealed that for tenants with the same evidence of conditions of disrepair, there were substantial and statistically significant differences in abatement outcomes based on representation status. Where substantial repairs were included in the first
settlement agreement, the abatement rate was 27 percent for
represented tenants compared with 0 percent for unrepresented
tenants. Where substantial repairs were included in multiple
settlement agreements and repairs were asserted in the Answer,
the abatement rate was 30 percent for represented tenants compared with 0 percent for unrepresented tenants.225 The full statistical results are reported in Table 8 below.
2. Violation cases.
Pearson’s chi-squared tests were also performed to test for
differences in the rate of rent abatements among represented
and unrepresented tenants with meritorious warranty claims,
where merit is indicated by open code violations. The results
showed that where there were open Class B or Class C violations at the unit at the time of case filing, the abatement rate
was 27 percent for represented tenants compared with 3 percent
for unrepresented tenants, and that this difference was statistically significant. Thus, legal representation had a demonstrated
positive effect on the ability of tenants to successfully invoke the
225 Where repairs were asserted in the Answer, the abatement rate was 22 percent
for represented tenants compared with 1 percent for unrepresented tenants.
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warranty of habitability. This finding is consistent with the finding in the “all nonpayment cases” dataset, which likewise
showed that representation affected tenants’ likelihood of benefiting from the warranty. The full statistical results are reported
in Table 8 below.
TABLE 8: ABATEMENT RATES IN REPRESENTED VERSUS
UNREPRESENTED CASES
Evidence of
conditions of
disrepairs

Abatement
rate in
represented
cases
27%

Abatement
rate in
unrepresented
cases
0%

Substantial repairs
in settlement
agreement*
Substantial repairs
30%
0%
in multiple settlement agreements
and repairs in
Answer*
Violation cases
27%
3%
No conditions of
0%
0%
disrepair**
* One of two “meritorious claim” groups among all
nonpayment of rent cases
** “No meritorious claim” group

Pvalue
0.003
0.003

0.003
—

3. Discussion.
The findings show that legal representation substantially
affects a tenant’s likelihood of receiving a rent abatement when
he or she has a meritorious warranty of habitability claim.
Strikingly, they demonstrate that the warranty of habitability is
all but inaccessible to tenants without counsel who appear to
satisfy the elements of the claim but who do not have open code
violations at their units. Tenants are simply unable to reap the
benefit of the claim prescribed by the law on paper—a rent
abatement—when they are unrepresented. Represented tenants
with the same evidence of conditions of disrepair have a one-infour or one-in-three chance of receiving a rent abatement. The
warranty is slightly more useful to unrepresented tenants where
there are open code violations in the unit, with 3 percent receiving rent abatements. However, the impact of representation is
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still extremely significant. Represented tenants are nine times
as likely to receive a rent abatement as compared to unrepresented tenants who have the same number and class levels of
open code violations at their units. Representation, in short,
dramatically affects the ability of tenants to benefit from the
warranty of habitability.
At the same time, these findings indicate that representation does not fully account for the operationalization gap in the
warranty of habitability. At most, between one-quarter and onethird of represented tenants with meritorious warranty of habitability claims receive rent abatements. This means that at
least two-thirds of tenants with meritorious warranty claims do
not benefit from the claim despite having legal representation.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS FOR OUR UNDERSTANDING OF
THE WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE
The findings of this study reshape our understanding of the
effectiveness of the warranty of habitability. The findings provide the most conclusive evidence to date that there is a large
operationalization gap in the law. All prior large-scale empirical
studies on the warranty have measured the rate at which the
claim was asserted or won within the overall population of nonpayment of rent eviction cases, without distinguishing between
cases of tenants with and without meritorious claims. This prior
research sounded the alarm that the law was likely ineffective,
but left open the possibility that the low usage rate simply
reflected a low rate of tenants with meritorious claims. This
study addressed these methodological shortcomings by specifically measuring the size of the gap between tenants who have
meritorious warranty claims and those who benefit from the
law. It also took into account the possibility that tenants with
meritorious claims were forgoing rent abatements—the relief
explicitly provided under the law—in favor of other benefits in
their cases. The results together showed that more than
90 percent of tenants with meritorious claims did not benefit
from the warranty at all. The results further revealed that tenants were unable to use the law as a tool to secure needed
repairs. While judges often ordered landlords to perform repairs,
the data shows that landlords evaded compliance with the
orders nearly three-quarters of the time. These findings strongly
indicate that the warranty of habitability suffers from a major
operationalization gap.
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The results of this study are especially significant because
they upend the traditional wisdom about the driving forces behind the warranty’s ineffectiveness. Almost all of the existing
scholarship on the warranty of habitability to date has attributed its failures to the barriers imposed by restrictive substantive
doctrines and the lack of access to counsel. The findings here
show that those explanations are inadequate. First, the study
found that tenants’ claims have a low rate of effectiveness even
where the law is unencumbered by restrictive substantive doctrines. New York’s warranty of habitability laws lack onerous
notice, good faith withholding, or rent escrow requirements—
indeed, tenants face few formal hurdles to assertion of the claim.
Existing scholarship would suggest that this backdrop would
translate into widespread use of the claim.226 Yet the study
found the opposite: very few tenants with meritorious claims
actually benefited from the law.
It certainly may be the case that even fewer tenants benefit
from the warranty of habitability where restrictive doctrines exist. However, the findings of this study demonstrate that these
doctrines cannot, without more, explain the low usage rates of
the law. This result has serious implications for policy.
Proposals for legal reforms to the warranty of habitability, particularly those put forth by scholars and advocates in recent
years, have focused primarily on the rollback of these restrictive
doctrines.227 The findings suggest that those reforms are unlikely
to result in widespread effectiveness of the law.228
The study’s findings also disrupt our understandings and
assumptions about the role of access to counsel in the effectiveness of the warranty of habitability. While the data showed unambiguously that representation mattered, it also revealed that
the lack of access to counsel did not account for the majority of
the warranty of habitability’s operationalization gap. This finding has important implications for future research and policy. In
2017, shortly after the period for which the data in this study
was collected, New York City became the first jurisdiction in the
United States to enact legislation establishing universal access

226 See Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 34 (cited in note 19); Super,
99 Cal L Rev at 434–36 (cited in note 19); Tokarz and Schmook, 53 Wash U J L & Pol at
178 (cited in note 86).
227 See Super, 99 Cal L Rev at 458–60 (cited in note 19); Franzese, Gorin, and
Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 31–34 (cited in note 19).
228 See Part IV.D.
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to counsel for low-income tenants in eviction proceedings.229 The
legislation is being phased in over a five-year period such that
all income-eligible tenants will be offered free legal counsel by
2022.230 Other jurisdictions quickly followed suit: in 2018, a San
Francisco ballot initiative established the right to counsel for all
tenants in eviction cases, and Newark, New Jersey passed an
ordinance guaranteeing representation to tenants under
200 percent of the federal poverty line.231 A number of motivations underlie these initiatives, among them that the provision
of counsel would lead to stronger outcomes for tenants and
greater enforcement of existing protections.232
While only a comprehensive and rigorous evaluation of the
implementation of the laws will show their effects, the findings
in this study suggest that they will likely enhance usage of the
warranty of habitability for tenants with meritorious claims. In
this regard, the study’s findings lend support to scholars’ contentions that the lack of access to counsel acts as a barrier to the
effectiveness of the warranty of habitability.233 They also bolster
existing views that expanded access to counsel will improve outcomes for tenants.234 However, the results also indicate that the
provision of legal representation likely will not, on its own, be
enough to expand the benefits of the warranty of habitability to
all—or even most—tenants with meritorious claims. The study
229 See Vicki Been, et al, Implementing New York City’s Universal Access to Counsel
Program: Lessons for Other Jurisdictions *2 (NYU Furman Center, Dec 11, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/L686-6L62 (Furman Center Report).
230 Id at *2 & n 2.
231 See Laura Waxmann, Tenant Advocacy Groups Set to Receive Funding Under
‘Right to Counsel’ Program (San Francisco Examiner, Nov 28, 2018), archived at
https://perma.cc/HDG6-BKH5; Jared Brey, Tenants’ Right to Counsel on the Move, Next
Stop Newark, (Next City, Jan 10, 2019) archived at https://perma.cc/PWD7-9S9H. Other
jurisdictions have also introduced or piloted legislation to create similar policies, including Boston, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and Washington, DC. See also Furman Center
Report at *2 (cited in note 229); City of Boston, Mayor Walsh Announces 2019 Housing
Security, Economic Mobility Legislative Agenda (Jan 7, 2019), archived at
https://perma.cc/8CU9-6Z2T.
232 See Furman Center Report at *3–6 (cited in note 229).
233 See Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 13 (cited in note 19);
Cotton, 19 CUNY L Rev at 84 (cited in note 28) (noting that “[t]he lack of counsel means
that the parties are particularly dependent on the court to ensure that the rule of law is
applied”); id at 86–87 (arguing that advocates hoping to improve utilization of the implied warranty of habitability should not focus their efforts on access to counsel because
the data suggest that all efforts thus far have faltered, and moreover the provision of
additional lawyers would impose considerable resource demands on the courts). But see
Bezdek, 20 Hofstra L Rev at 538 n 16 (cited in note 27) (arguing against a solution involving access to counsel because it is “parentalistic [sic] and it lets us off the hook for
our parts in the charade of legal entitlement and rights vindication”).
234 See note 233.
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showed that among tenants with meritorious claims who had legal representation, 75 percent did not benefit from the claim.
Thus, while universal access to counsel is likely to improve the
effectiveness of the warranty, it is unlikely to serve as a cure-all.
The findings also cast doubt on the argument that the warranty’s ineffectiveness is attributable in part to the inaccessibility of Housing Code records. Professor Franzese has argued that
in many jurisdictions, judges are without the tools to effectively
enforce the warranty of habitability because there is no centralized and publicly available code violation database.235 Franzese
has hypothesized that the availability of those records to judges
through a centralized database would promote enforcement of
the warranty.236 Unfortunately, findings here strongly indicate
that the mere existence of such a system is not, without more, a
cure-all for improving the usage of the warranty. Judges in New
York City have precisely the tools Franzese identified—indeed,
Franzese points to New York City’s integrated system as a model for other jurisdictions to follow—but the data show that judges rarely took advantage of them. Moreover, few tenants benefited from the warranty of habitability despite the existence of
this integrated system.237
These conclusions signal that current understandings of the
barriers to use of the warranty of habitability are incomplete.
None of the existing theories for the law’s ineffectiveness withstands empirical scrutiny. While the data show that some of the
identified barriers, such as lack of access to counsel, certainly
contribute to the claim’s underuse, they also show that these
barriers cannot account for the scope of the underuse.
CONCLUSION
Nearly fifty years ago, the US Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit declared that the warranty of habitability was implied in all residential leases. Proponents hailed
the development as a revolution in tenants’ rights. Professor
Myron Moskovitz, writing in the California Law Review shortly
after the first jurisdictions adopted the implied warranty of habitability, predicted that by giving tenants the power to enforce
235

See Franzese, Gorin, and Guzik, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 37 (cited in note 19).
Id at 22.
237 These findings suggest that a more tightly structured system for integrating eviction case adjudication with code enforcement records, like that proposed by Professor Zulack, may be needed to ensure that judges in fact take advantage of the availability of code
enforcement records. See Zulack, 40 John Marshall L Rev at 449–53 (cited in note 146).
236
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laws prohibiting substandard housing, the courts’ rulings would
spur improvements to the quality of housing, particularly that
enjoyed by low-income tenants in urban settings.238 The law
would do so “not merely by adding to the number of enforcers,”
but by allowing enforcement to be driven by those most affected.239 This Article presents the results of the first rigorous empirical study assessing the effectiveness of the warranty of habitability. The study demonstrates that tenants overwhelmingly
do not benefit from the warranty even when they are likely to
have meritorious claims. Specifically, the study found that a
mere 2.35 to 9 percent of tenants with meritorious warranty of
habitability claims receive rent abatements. The findings also
ruled out the possibility that tenants are receiving other types of
benefits from the claim, such as a longer repayment period or
avoidance of a possessory judgment. And further, the findings
indicate that the warranty of habitability does not serve as an
effective tool within eviction cases to compel landlords to perform repairs—although the court often orders landlords to complete repairs, the data strongly suggest that landlords rarely
comply with these orders.
This study was also the first to rigorously evaluate whether
and to what extent legal representation affects a tenant’s likelihood of benefiting from the warranty of habitability. It found
that representation mattered significantly—tenants with meritorious warranty of habitability claims had between a 0 and
3 percent chance of obtaining an abatement when they were unrepresented, compared with an approximately 27 percent chance
when they had representation. This finding strongly supports
providing increased access to counsel as one way to improve usage of the claim. Yet the findings should also sober expectations
that a right to counsel will eliminate the warranty of habitability operationalization gap. Approximately 73 percent of tenants
who had meritorious claims and were represented by counsel
still did not benefit from the law.
The findings of the study also caution against an overfocus
on the onerous substantive doctrines that exist in some jurisdictions. While those doctrines may very well impose additional
barriers to the implementation of the warranty where they exist,
238 See Myron Moskovitz, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: A New Doctrine
Raising New Issues, 62 Cal L Rev 1444, 1504 (1974). Moskovitz further hailed the new
law as providing greater bargaining leverage to tenants in settlement negotiations with
their landlords in eviction cases. Id.
239 Id at 1503.
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the results here show that their existence does not fully—or
even primarily—account for the operationalization gap. Even
where the warranty of habitability is unencumbered by these
doctrines, it is still not widely enforced.
These conclusions signal strongly that more quantitative
and qualitative research is needed to identify other procedural
and/or substantive legal barriers to the claim’s usage beyond
those identified by the existing scholarship. Preliminary qualitative and legal research conducted in conjunction with the quantitative research presented here suggests that nondiscretionary
cure period rules severely restrict the use of the warranty. Until
2019,240 New York had a nondiscretionary cure period rule,
codified at New York RPAPL § 747-a but commonly known as
the Five-Day Rule, which provided that if a landlord has obtained a judgment in a nonpayment eviction proceeding and
“more than five days has elapsed,” then “the court shall not
grant a stay of the issuance or execution of any warrant of eviction” until the tenant has paid the amount of the judgment.241 In
the context of the warranty of habitability, the effect of this
statute was that where a tenant is awarded a rent abatement at
trial due to the landlord’s breach of the warranty of habitability,
unless the rent abatement was for 100 percent of the arrears,
the tenant would be required to pay the balance of the rent owed
within five days in order to avoid eviction.
Statutes like the Five-Day Rule are quite common across jurisdictions, yet have received virtually no scholarly attention in
discussions of the effectiveness of the warranty of habitability.242
At least seven other states have equivalent rules providing for
very short, nondiscretionary cure periods upon a finding of rent
owed to the landlord.243 The cure periods established in these

240

All cases included in this study were from 2016. See Part III.
NY Real Prop Law § 747-a (1997), repealed by L2019, ch 36, pt M § 18 (effective
June 14, 2019).
242 No scholarly publication of which I am aware has referenced cure period
restrictions as a factor in the effectiveness of the warranty of habitability.
243 See Cal Civ Pro Code § 1174.2(a) (five-day cure period which judge has no authority to extend); 25 Del Code Ann § 5716 (ten-day cure period if “good faith dispute”
caused the nonpayment); Mass Gen Laws Ann ch 239, § 8A (seven-day nondiscretionary
cure period); Mich Comp Laws Ann § 600.5744(4) (nondiscretionary ten-day cure period);
NM Stat Ann § 47-8-33.E(2) (three-day nondiscretionary cure period so long as tenant
complies with requirements of state’s rent withholding statute); 12 Okla Stat Ann
§ 1148.10B.B (three-day nondiscretionary period conditional upon tenant’s compliance
with certain notice requirements); Wash Rev Code Ann § 59.18.410 (five-day nondiscretionary cure period).
241
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states range from three to ten days.244 Even worse, at least thirty
states provide tenants no cure rights at all.245 Thus, in these jurisdictions, if at the conclusion of trial the judge determines that
the tenant owes one dollar of rent or more, the tenant has no opportunity to satisfy the balance and will face near-immediate
eviction. This outcome is the same regardless of whether the tenant has withheld rent for defective conditions in good faith and/or
whether the court has awarded the tenant a partial rent abatement for the landlord’s violation of the warranty of habitability.
These rules significantly increase the risks of taking a nonpayment of rent case to trial for the purpose of securing a rent
abatement. As shown by the data here, repayment agreements
will almost always provide tenants more than ten days to repay
the arrears.246 That longer period of time is often necessary for
tenants to save up enough money to pay down the balance, or to
seek out and obtain charitable assistance. Thus, in jurisdictions
with nondiscretionary cure periods, tenants are unwise to take a
case to trial unless they are in possession of or have ready access
to the balance of the arrears (whatever the amount of that balance may be, as determined by the judge). In jurisdictions with
no cure rights, tenants who take their case to trial must be confident that the amount of the rent abatement will exceed the
amount of rent owed.
Because cure period restrictions affect tenants’ risks of taking a case to trial for the purpose of achieving a rent abatement,
they also heavily influence tenants’ ability to negotiate a rent

244

See note 243.
See Ala Code Ann § 35-9A-461(e); Ala Rule Civ P 62(a), 62(dc); Alaska Stat Ann
§§ 34.03.190, 34.03.220(b); Ariz Rev Stat § 12-1178.C; Colo Rev Stat Ann § 13-40-122; Ga
Code Ann § 44-7-53; Hawaii Rev Stat §§ 666-11, 666-14; Idaho Code § 6-316; 735 ILCS
5/9-209; Ind Code Ann § 32-31-1-6; Iowa Code § 562A.27; Kan Stat Ann § 58-2561; Ky
Rev Ann Stat § 383.240; La Civ Code Ann § 2704; Md Real Prop Code Ann § 8-401(e)(1);
Minn Stat §§ 504B.291, 504B.285; Miss Code Ann §§ 11-25-23, 89-7-41; Mo Rev Stat
§ 535.020; Mont Code Ann § 70-24-427; Neb Rev Stat § 76-1446; Nev Rev Stat Ann
§ 40.414; NH Rev Stat Ann § 540.14; NJ Stat Ann § 2A:42-92; NC Gen Stat § 42-26; ND
Cent Code § 47-32-01; Ohio Rev Code Ann § 1923.13; Or Rev Stat §§ 105.145, 105.161; 68
Pa Cons Stat Ann § 250.503; RI Gen Laws § 34-18-51; SD Cod Laws § 21-16-1 et seq;
Tenn Code Ann §§ 29-18-126, 66-28-501; Tex Rule Civ P 509, 510; Tex Prop Code
§§ 92.056, 92.0561, 92.056; Utah Code Ann §§ 57-22-5, 57-22-6, 78B-6-808, 78B-6-811;
Va Code Ann § 55.1-1251; W Va Code §§ 37-6-8, 37-6-19; Wis Stat § 799.44; Wyo Stat
Ann §§ 1-21-1008, 1-21-1206(d).
246 The average length of the repayment period among all nonpayment of rent cases
(in the “all nonpayment of rent cases” dataset) was 38.6 days. See Part IV.B.1. There
was no statistically significant difference between the length of the repayment period in
“likely meritorious claim” cases and “likely no meritorious claim” cases.
245
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abatement in a settlement agreement.247 In jurisdictions with
nondiscretionary cure rules, tenants who do not possess the
amount of money likely to represent the remainder of the arrears found owed are unable to successfully negotiate a rent
abatement because they cannot make good on the threat of taking the case to trial. Similarly, in jurisdictions with no cure
rights, tenants have little leverage to negotiate a rent abatement because landlords know that tenants are unlikely to take
their case to trial: if any amount of rent is found to be owed—
that is, if the rent abatement is any less than the full value of
the arrears—the tenant will be evicted.
Additional research should also explore whether the ineffectiveness of the warranty of habitability is attributable to nondoctrinal factors such as court culture or imbalances of power.
The preliminary qualitative research conducted in conjunction
with the quantitative research presented here suggests that a
debt collection culture of the housing courts may play a significant role.248 Some tenants described the Housing Court culture
as treating landlords’ rights to collect rent more seriously than
tenants’ rights to adequate housing. Tenants reported numerous
instances of failed efforts to hold their landlords accountable for
property conditions, which occurred simultaneously while they
were being held responsible for their rental obligations. According to tenants’ accounts, their efforts failed not because their
claims were invalid or because they were unfamiliar with the
proper legal procedures, but because judges did not want to
entertain them.
Further research should be conducted into both of these—as
well as many other—possible explanations for the limits of the
law.

247 Settlements are negotiated “in the shadow of the law.” See generally Don L.
Coursey and Linda R. Stanley, Pretrial Bargaining Behavior Within the Shadow of the
Law: Theory and Experimental Evidence, 8 Intl Rev L & Econ 161 (1988); Robert Cooter,
Stephen Marks, and Robert Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable
Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J Legal Stud 225 (1982). According to this theory, parties
justify their own settlement positions and evaluate the strength of the opposing side’s
positions based on an analysis of likely outcomes and willingness to go to trial. Cooter,
Marks, and Mnookin, 11 J Legal Stud at 228–29 (cited in note 247). Where one side is
aware that the other side is unable to support their position at trial, or is unlikely to
incur the risk involved with taking the case to trial, that side is unlikely to cede to the
other side’s demands. Id at 245.
248 See, for example, Bezdek, 20 Hofstra L Rev at 569 (cited in note 27) (qualitatively
describing nonpayment of rent proceedings and calling them “scene[s] . . . of debt collection”).
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APPENDIX: CASE FILE CODING GUIDELINES
Background Information About the Case
Criteria
Rent-regulation
status of the unit

Legal representation

Coding Guideline
This information was coded based on
the landlord’s assertion of the rentregulation status in the petition.249
Units were classified in one of three categories: rent-regulated status, market
status, and nonprofit or governmentowned.
Tenants were coded as either represented or unrepresented based on
whether they had representation at the
time they entered into the first settlement agreement.

Answer
Criteria
Date of Answer
Whether repairs are
asserted in the
Answer

Coding Guideline
The date the tenant completed the Answer was marked.
Cases were coded either “yes” or “no.”
The pro se Answer form includes a
checkbox option which states, “There are
or were conditions in the apartment
and/or the building/house which the Petitioner did not repair and/or services
which the Petitioner did not provide.”
“Yes” was marked when the box was
checked, and “No” was marked when the
box was blank, unless the tenant later received leave of court to amend the Answer and in the Amended Answer included a similar claim asserting conditions of
disrepair (including an express claim for
breach of the warranty of habitability).

249 An eviction complaint is referred to as a “petition” under New York law. Landlords are required to state the rent-regulation status of the unit in the petition. See NY
Real Prop Law § 741.
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Whether a service
defect is asserted
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Coding Guideline
The pro se Answer form includes two
checkbox options related to service defects: (1) “I did not receive the Notice of
Petition and Petition” and (2) “I received
the Notice of Petition and Petition, but
service was not correct as required by
law.” “Yes” was marked when either of
the boxes was checked, and “No” was
marked when both boxes were blank,
unless the tenant later received leave
of court to amend the Answer and in the
Amended Answer asserted a service
defect.

Case Outcomes
Criteria
Date of first settlement agreement
Whether the settlement agreement includes a judgment
for the landlord

Number of days for
payment of the
arrears

Coding Guideline
The date of the first settlement agreement resulting in a case disposition was
marked.
This was coded as “yes” or “no” based on
whether the first settlement agreement
granted a judgment for possession to the
landlord. Where the case was discontinued, this outcome was coded as
“DISCON.” Cases that went to trial were
marked “TRIAL.”
The number of days between the date
the settlement agreement was entered
and the date the arrears were due.
Where the settlement agreement set a
schedule for incremental repayments
over a period of time longer than sixty
days, the outcome was coded as “pay
agreement.” Where the settlement
agreement set a schedule for incremental repayments over a period of time
shorter than sixty days, the length of
time was calculated based on the final
date on which repayment would be due.
Where the case was discontinued, this
outcome was coded as “DISCON.” All
coding was based on the first settlement
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Criteria
Amount of arrears
owed

Whether the settlement agreement requires the landlord
to make substantial
repairs

Whether there are
multiple settlement
agreements

Same repairs in
multiple settlement
agreements
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Coding Guideline
agreement. Cases that went to trial were
marked “TRIAL.”
The amount owed was as stated on the
settlement agreement as the amount of
arrears due and owing. Where a rent
abatement was awarded, the abatement
amount was not reflected. Ongoing use
and occupancy also was not included.
“DISCON” was coded for discontinued
cases. All coding was based on the first
settlement agreement.
This was coded as “yes”/“no.” “Yes” was
coded where the settlement agreement
included repairs of conditions that qualify as rent impairing pursuant to NY
Multiple Dwelling Law § 302-a. “Yes”
was also coded where the agreement included repairs of conditions that have
been found to constitute a violation of
the warranty of habitability, which includes, inter alia: lack of heat and/or hot
water; flooding; fumes and/or smoke,
leaking gas; lead paint; bedbugs; mold;
broken appliances (for example, refrigerator or stove); cockroaches; secondhand
smoke; mice and/or rats; noise and/or
dust; failure to install kitchen facilities,
and broken locks.
This was coded as “yes” or “no” only if
the first settlement agreement included
substantial repairs. “NA” was marked
if the first settlement agreement did
not include substantial repairs or was a
discontinuance.
Coded as “yes” if there are multiple settlement agreements and a subsequent
settlement agreement requires the landlord to make the same repairs as required by the first settlement agreement
and the access dates in the first settlement agreement have passed. Marked as
“no” if there are substantial repairs in
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Criteria

Coding Guideline
the first settlement agreement and the
same repairs are not included in a
subsequent settlement agreement but
the access dates have passed. Marked
as “NA” if the access dates have not
passed or if there were not substantial
repairs included in the first settlement
agreement.
Abatement
Coded as “yes” or “no” based on whether
the settlement agreement expressly
stated that the landlord granted the tenant a rent abatement.
Abatement amount
The dollar amount of the abatement
awarded.
Amount of arrears
Coded as “yes” or “no” based on whether
owed of $7,000,
the amount of arrears owed as stated on
$9,000, or $11,000
the settlement agreement was either
$7,000, $9,000, or $11,000.
Prospective setting of Coded as “yes” or “no” based on whether
rent
the settlement agreement prospectively
sets the tenant’s rent.
Housing Code Enforcement
Criteria
HPD record in file

Coding Guideline
This was coded as “yes” or “no” based on
whether there was a printed-out record
of the Code enforcement history of the
unit in the case file.
Housing Code inspec- This was coded as “yes” or “no” based on
tion order/request
whether the judge submitted a standardized form titled “Judicial Request/Order for Housing Inspection.”

